Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

89. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 19, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with SEATO Ministers

You have agreed to meet with the SEATO Council Ministers at 5:00 p.m. today. I sent you a suggested statement last night.²

In connection with any informal discussions with the Ministers, the following background may be useful:

• —For several years, the Thai and Filipinos have been concerned that we would let the foot-dragging of France and, to a lesser extent, of Pakistan and the UK sap SEATOʼs vitality.
• —France, for the first time, refused to send even an observer to the current meetings, but has not given any sign of an intent to withdraw or stop paying its dues.
• —The UK declined to send any military forces to Viet-Nam and has taken an increasingly restrictive attitude toward many SEATO activities.
• —Pakistan has stopped active participation in SEATO military planning and intelligence work, but it continues to pay its share of the budget.
• —The Thai have increasingly questioned the usefulness of participation in SEATO by those who will not assume real responsibility, notably France, the UK and Pakistan.

With the exception of Korean forces, the only military contributions to Viet-Nam have come from four SEATO partners (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines).

If you meet the Ministers and one other delegate from each country in the Mansion, you might:

(1) welcome each one personally;

(2) make a few remarks (text submitted last night; alternatively, express your general feelings about Viet Nam, rather than SEATO;

(3) talk briefly with each of the ministers.

If the meeting is in the Cabinet room, you might:

(1) let Sec. Rusk introduce you to each of the ministers, going around the table;

(2) ask Sec. Rusk to bring you up to date on the SEATO meeting itself;

(3) ask for comments by each senior minister present;

(4) either talk along the lines of the text submitted last night or simply express your general view and feelings about Viet Nam.³

I personally recommended the former procedure because:

• —the informal setting will be more congenial;
• —the hospitality of the President in his home will be appreciated by the members more than a more formal gathering;
• —these men will have been sitting around a conference table for most of two days, and a more personal contact with the President will mean more to them.

Walt

Arrange for informal reception in the Mansion⁴

Arrange meeting in the Cabinet Room

Invite two members per delegation (total 17) (present situation)

Invite three members per delegation (total 24)

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SEATO. Confidential.
2. Apparent reference to “Talking Points,” transmitted by Read to Rostow, April 18. (Ibid.)
3. Rostow added the following handwritten note in parentheses: “I prefer the latter.”
4. There is no indication on the source text as to the Presidentʼs choice, but for the account of the meeting, see Document 90.