Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

88. Scope Paper Prepared for the SEATO Council Meeting¹

SEATO/G–1

Washington, April 4, 1967.

SEATO COUNCIL MEETING

Washington, April 18–20, 1967

SCOPE PAPER

U.S. Objectives

1. To demonstrate to the U.S. public and to other countries that SEATO is a going concern, serving an important purpose, and that the U.S. strongly supports the Organization.

2. To demonstrate continuing SEATO support for the GVN in its effort to stem Communist aggression as well as to dramatize GVN appreciation for such support.

3. To demonstrate continuing SEATO support for Thailand in its effort to suppress Communist-directed insurgence there.

4. To sustain SEATOʼs sense of mission in strengthening “the fabric of peace and freedom” in Southeast Asia.

5. To gain greater public understanding of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, including the relevance of our SEATO obligation, and the danger to the whole area the Communist threat in Viet-Nam represents.

Means of Attaining Objectives

1. By providing, as host, conference arrangements and representational functions in accord with SEATO precedents and of such a character as to demonstrate the special political and military importance we attach to the Organization.

2. By generating the widest possible publicity for the Council Meeting, including statements made by our SEATO allies and the Vietnamese observer.

3. By working for a strong endorsement in the communiqué of the GVNʼs resistance to Communist aggression, of its plans and preparations for the transition of constitutional, representative government in South Viet-Nam and of the GVNʼs commitment to programs for revolutionary development, economic stability and progress, and national reconciliation as set forth in the Manila communiqué of October 1966.

4. By including in the communiqué a clear endorsement of Thailandʼs efforts to suppress the insurgency sponsored within her borders by external Communists, and by publicizing this Communist sponsorship and citing the evidence thereof.

5. By making clear U.S. support for appropriate cultural activities of SEATO, including our willingness to contribute financial support for approved programs.

6. By making clear U.S. support for appropriate economic activities of SEATO, including our willingness to contribute financial support for approved programs, and recognizing that SEATO should give priority consideration to countersubversion and counterinsurgency type projects in order to avoid duplication with other multilateral efforts in the region.

7. By developing U.S. statements on Viet-Nam, on Thailand and on SEATO that will be concrete and constructive.

Possible Obstacles

1. The U.K. will wish to ensure that there is no implication in the communiqué that the U.K is committed to any military contribution to Viet-Nam and will probably take a generally cautious approach to SEATOʼs work.

2. Pakistan is likely to be largely passive except possibly in making an effort to include reference to Pakistan-Indian problems in the communiqué. It may register a reservation to any strong reference to Communist aggression in Viet-Nam.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 170. Secret. Drafted by Wilber W. Hitchcox of EA/RA, cleared by Rusk and representatives of 15 relevant bureaus and offices in the Department of State and AID.