Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

39. Memorandum of Conversation¹

I–22926/68

Washington, May 29, 1968, 4:30–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of Australian Prime Minister, John G. Gorton

PARTICIPANTS

• United States Side
  • Secretary of Defense—Clark M. Clifford
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Richard C. Steadman
  • Staff Officer for Southwest Pacific Affairs (ISA)—Donald E. Nuechterlein
• Australian Side
  • Prime Minister—John G. Gorton
  • Ambassador to United States—Sir Keith Waller
  • Secretary to the Prime Minister—C.L.S. Hewitt

The Prime Minister wanted to assure the Secretary, as he had the President earlier, that Australia will continue to carry out its commitments in Asia in accordance with its ANZUS and SEATO obligations. However, the question which bothered him was the future role of Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore, which are not covered by either of these treaties. He had concluded that the British would not return to Southeast Asia under any circumstances after 1971, and he did not believe that Australia and New Zealand alone could provide a credible military force there. Australia could probably station two squadrons of fighter aircraft and some ships in Malaysia and Singapore, but only a small ground force. His government could not see the purpose of more than a token ground force in this area because Australia did not wish to become involved in communal problems within Malaysia nor in any future cross border difficulties that might arise between Singapore and Malaysia. A small ground force might be of some help in combatting minor insurgency situations, but it would be of little use in larger insurgencies, particularly if supported from the outside. The Prime Minister said he was not asking for anything specific from the United States but was seeking to determine the importance the U.S. placed upon future Australian policy in Malaysia/Singapore.

Secretary Clifford responded by recalling the trip that he and General Taylor made to Asia in the Summer of 1967 to seek additional support from our allies for the Vietnam war. He said such support was essential in order that the President could show the Congress and the American public that the U.S. was not alone in sending additional forces to Vietnam. He felt that this symbolic support from our allies was also essential to our own continued involvement in Southeast Asia and that it was important that there be no appearance of a withdrawal of Australian military forces from the area in the near future. This is an important year insofar as U.S. public opinion is concerned, because of the presidential elections, and it would be a very serious matter if the word got around that a “power vacuum” was developing in Malaysia/Singapore area which the U.S. would be expected to fill. It was not the U.S. commitment to help defend Southeast Asia that is in question in this country but rather the extent of that commitment. The U.S. public had been willing to support the current level of involvement in Vietnam and Thailand, he said, but would not accept broadening our responsibility in the area. In particular, it would be very difficult for the American public to understand a withdrawal from the area—such as a pullback from Malaysia and Singapore by any of our allies, who actually are closer to the area than we are. They would ask: If Southeast Asia is not important to our allies, why should it be to us?

In answer to a question by the Prime Minister, the Secretary gave it as his personal view that the U.S. involvement in Singapore and Malaysia is now so deeply rooted that the American public would not permit simply writing it off.² In answer to the Prime Ministerʼs question on whether there might be a “paper-over” agreement at Paris, the Secretary said “no.” He added that he felt there was an area of agreement between the two sides that eventually will bring about a settlement. In the meantime, the U.S. will gradually phase-down its military activities as the South Vietnamese increase their own role. The Secretary felt that American opinion accepted the current level of U.S. involvement but that it would have an “exceedingly important” impact in the U.S. if the impression were created that our allies were wavering in their support of the effort in Southeast Asia. The U.S. therefore believes that an Australian presence there is very important.

The Prime Minister replied that the problem for Australia is not the immediate future but rather the period after 1971, when the British have left the area. He thought it might be possible to leave Air Force and Navy units in Malaysia and Singapore after the British departed, but he was not convinced about ground forces. Also, his government would have to address the question whether, in the post Vietnam period, it would be more important to build up its armed forces, including a larger army, or to expend larger amounts on economic development of Australiaʼs large untapped resources. Within the defense budget that is finally agreed upon, Australia had to decide how best to spend its defense dollar—whether more ships and planes, or more battalions. He was inclined to believe that, given Australiaʼs geographical position, it was more important to provide for a strong Navy and Air Force in peacetime. He asked for the Secretaryʼs views on this matter.

Mr. Clifford reiterated his view that it would be very damaging in the U.S. if Australia announced its intention to withdraw any or all of its forces from Malaysia and Singapore. However, he conceded that the political situation in Southeast Asia could change significantly by 1971 and that it might not be necessary in the 1970ʼs to station large forces on the mainland of Asia. He thought there was a good possibility that some new regional organization of Asian states might evolve that could take over some of the security responsibilities presently shouldered by outside powers. He assumed that by 1971 the Vietnam war would be ended and speculated that the large amounts of equipment we presently have in Vietnam could be made available to support a regional security force. The Secretary said that he would welcome talks with the Australian Government over the next several years concerning the changing conditions in Southeast Asia and our plans for dealing with them.

The Prime Minister assured the Secretary that Australia would make no announcement about withdrawing from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, but he thought it possible that Australia would state at the forthcoming 5-power talks in Kuala Lumpur that it would re-evaluate its position in 1971 to determine its future course. The Secretary expressed a hope that this would not leave the implication that 1971 might be the end of Australiaʼs involvement in the area.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Secretary felt that an Australian presence in Malaysia and Singapore was essentially a public relations rather than a military problem. Mr. Clifford replied that the presence of some Australian forces in this area is significant in U.S. public willingness to remain in Southeast Asia. He added that it was his personal opinion that the cost of these limited forces was far outweighed by the repercussions on Australiaʼs long-range defense interests which would result if these forces were withdrawn or if an intention to do so were announced in the near future.

The Prime Minister asserted that keeping forces in Malaysia and Singapore was a political, not an economic, problem for Australia. However, as Australia is a developing country, many Australians wondered if the funds could not better be spent by providing a stronger defense at home. He agreed with the Secretary that a developing country needs a shield behind which to continue its development and that ANZUS provided such a shield to Australia.

Mr. Gorton asked Mr. Hewitt if he had anything further to add. Mr. Hewitt spoke briefly on the question of possible DOD purchases in Australia, noting the large amounts of equipment that Australia is buying from the U.S. Mr. Hewitt outlined the resultant balance of payments problem and cited the recent U.S. agreements to procure sugar and ammunition from Australia as examples of purchases that were of great help to the Australian economy. Secretary Clifford mentioned the recently increased R&R program in Australia as another significant means of providing dollars to Australia. The Prime Minister said he did not wish to press this matter but wanted the Secretary to know that it was an area in which his government was deeply interested. He hoped the Defense Department could give some thought to buying additional items in Australia.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Australia 091.112. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Nuechterlein and approved by Steadman. The meeting was held in Cliffordʼs office at the Pentagon.
2. Gorton also received similar assurance from Under Secretary of State Katzenbach who added that none of the candidates for President would consider changing the basic U.S.-Australian relationship. This was particularly true of Senator Robert Kennedy whom Katzenbach knew well. (Memorandum of conversation, May 28; Department of State, Central Files, POL MALAYSIA–SINGAPORE)