Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

38. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 27, 1968, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Future Australian Role in Malaysia/Singapore Security

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • President Lyndon B. Johnson
  • Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke
  • William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
  • William H. Crook, Ambassador-Designate to Australia
  • Samuel King, Assistant Chief of Protocol
  • Robert S. Lindquist, Country Director, Australia-New Zealand and Pacific Islands Affairs
  • Marshall Wright, National Security Council, Office of the President
• Australia
  • Prime Minister John G. Gorton
  • Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
  • Cyrus Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Ministerʼs Department

The President said that in his just concluded private meeting with Prime Minister Gorton,² the Prime Minister had raised certain questions about Australiaʼs future role in the security of the Malaysia/Singapore area in view of the projected withdrawal of U.K. military forces by 1971. The President asked Mr. Bundy to comment on this subject.

Mr. Bundy said that this problem, as we see it, divides into two time phases: (a) the period between now and December 1971, while U.K. forces remain in the area and (b) the period subsequent to December 1971, when removal of U.K. security forces will have been completed. Mr. Bundy noted that the U.K., Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, the Commonwealth countries now participating in security arrangements for that area, will meet in Kuala Lumpur on June 10 and 11 to discuss arrangements for the future, such as the part to be played by the various countries, logistics, financial matters, etc. Our view of the period beyond December 1971 is that we do not feel that we can take on any additional commitment or responsibility for defense of the area, but we hope that Australia and New Zealand will be willing to maintain forces in the area in sufficient strength to sustain a required level of confidence in Malaysia and Singapore that will enable those countries to cooperate in greater contribution to their own defense. The situation after 1971 will depend in part, he said, on factors that are now hard to foresee with accuracy, such as the Indonesian attitude at that time and the situation to the north of Malaysia and Singapore. However, Australian willingness to maintain forces in Malaysia/Singapore will contribute very importantly to stability in that area and will be an earnest of Australian capacity to carry out its SEATO undertakings.

Prime Minister Gorton said he had assured the President that there is no question about Australian obligations in other parts of Asia. In Malaysia and Singapore, he foresaw no great difficulty in maintaining Australian forces to 1971, even though he does not expect much result from the Kuala Lumpur meeting because, as he put it, the U.K. will not lay its cards on the table. Malaysia and Singapore must increase their own efforts during this period and Australia will exert pressure on them to do this. Gorton said that it might be feasible for Australia to “maintain a presence” in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971, especially if the U.K. is prepared to enter into arrangements which will permit the continued availability of such facilities as air and naval installations. Such a “presence” might consist of air and naval units which would be mobile and easily shifted. As for ground forces, Gorton questioned what role a modest Australian ground contingent would perform. He said that Australian ground units can be deployed to the SEATO area from Australia in about the same time as from Malaysia/Singapore. He wondered if in the event of a serious contingency, such as “Indonesia going around the bend again,” Australian ground units might not be “out on a limb” without United States backing under ANZUS such as was worked out in 1963 during confrontation with Indonesia. Gorton said that an Australian ground contingent might be effective for local needs but certainly not in the case of subversion or invasion of the Viet-Nam type. In any event, he said, Australia did not want its forces involved in possible communal problems in Malaysia and Singapore.

Perhaps, Gorton speculated, it would be better for Australia to provide NCOʼs, training, etc. to Malaysia/Singapore rather than try to maintain ground units there. Resources thus saved could be used to build up defense forces in Australia which might be more effective in a larger contingency.

Mr. Bundy spoke again of the political/psychological aspect of the need, as we see it, for Australia to continue a military role after 1971. He said that this would provide a stabilizing presence and help deter any possible Indonesian adventure or prevent any threat that would invoke SEATO. It would concern us, Mr. Bundy said, if Australia were not there to carry out this stabilizing and reassuring presence. Mr. Bundy recognized the need for greater Malaysian and Singaporean contribution to their own defense and said that we have seen some signs that those governments want to increase their efforts. However, Malaysia, and to lesser extent Singapore, are in uncertain economic situations and may not be able to add substantially to their defense expenditures. This would have to be weighed carefully. Malaysia and Singapore are suspicious of each other and every effort must be made to avoid a local arms race that might take place as an excessive reaction to a prospect that Australia would not continue its security presence after 1971—an undertaking that in some respects could be termed a confidence operation.

Prime Minister Gorton said that he does not foreclose the possibility that Australia will continue a military presence in the Peninsula after 1971, but this is an option he wants to leave open for the time being.

Mr. Bundy said he believed that any Malaysian and Singaporean doubt that Australia would continue such a role would have a very negative effect. It would be a far-reaching psychological setback in the area if it were thought that Australia would pull back.

Prime Minister Gorton inquired how large a force might be necessary to maintain the desired psychological effect.

Mr. Bundy replied while this is a difficult question, a force of approximately the size of the Australian component of the present Commonwealth brigade would give evidence both of Australian ability to meet its SEATO commitment and of intent to provide greater military resources if needed.

Mr. Gorton said that the “more if needed” aspect is part of the problem as he sees it. He believes that so-called future “U.K. capability” will have little substance and he asked what value there would be in maintaining an Australian ability to reinforce its units in Malaysia/Singapore when it is well-known that the Australian capacity to reinforce is limited. Gorton asked if Prime Minister Lee would question the importance for Australia to maintain this capability. Referring to Mr. Bundyʼs mention of an arms race in the area, Gorton asked if we do not want Malaysia/Singapore to increase their own defense efforts.

Mr. Bundy responded that we believe Prime Minister Lee would consider it important for Australia to maintain the ability to send reinforcements to the area. We do wish Malaysia and Singapore to devote greater resources to defense, but we believe this should be done in consultation with each other and with others interested in security in the area, should be complementary and should be accomplished within the limits of economic ability. Without an Australian presence in the area, these objectives would be very difficult to obtain.

Prime Minister Gorton said that the U.K. has manned much of the logistic network in the region and that if Australia is to contribute significantly more to logistic arrangements after 1971, many more Australian troops will be needed to maintain a continuing level of operational effectiveness. He wondered why Malaysia/Singapore couldnʼt assume greater responsibility for logistics.

Mr. Bundy replied that this seemed a good subject to raise in the June meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

Prime Minister Gorton concluded by reiterating that Australia has no question or problem concerning its commitments and obligations outside the Malaysia/Singapore area.³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Vol. III, Memos, 8/67–1/69. Secret. Drafted by Robert S. Lindquist, Deputy Country Director for Australia and New Zealand, cleared by Bundy, and approved by the White House on June 3. The White House approval is indicated on the Department of State copy of this memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, POL MALAYSIA–SINGAPORE) According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, the meeting, which was held at the White House, lasted until 1 p.m. when Gorton and Johnson went to the Oval Office for a picture-taking session. (Johnson Library)
2. Gorton and Johnson met privately in the West Hall of the White House from noon to 12:30 p.m. (Ibid., Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.
3. Gorton joined a breakfast meeting with Johnson and his Vietnam advisors on May 28; a memorandum of this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume VI. Johnson also met briefly with Gorton at 11:30 a.m. on May 28 (11:42 p.m. according to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, Johnson Library). During that meeting he encouraged Australia to participate in the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) based on the similarities of the economies of Australia and parts of Latin America. Australian contributions to the IADB would facilitate Latin American procurement of Australian goods. Gorton agreed to follow up on the Presidentʼs suggestion. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Australia, Vol. III, Memos, 8/67–1/69)