Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

381. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bangkok, March 22, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Thai Elections

PARTICIPANTS

• [name not declassified]
• Ambassador Unger

After I had taken up a few matters of current business I mentioned the forthcoming promulgation of the Constitution and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] took this as a signal to launch into an extended discussion about elections and possible confidential US assistance. He referred to much earlier conversations with Ambassador Martin and a more recent discussion with Robert Jantzen and said that with the elections now almost definitely scheduled for early in 1969, the help earlier requested would soon be in order.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] again made clear that only he, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were privy to the discussions previously held with Americans. He emphasized that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and other leaders were definitely not informed and made clear his concern that at this stage the matter not be discussed with them.

Basically he said what is desired is the election of a strong anti-Communist government party which will assure that the Communists, either directly or through infiltration, do not gain an influential or controlling position in the Thai Government. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] emphasized that he was talking about a government-wide party including [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and he was convinced that this could be achieved. He mentioned his reservations about some of the things which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is associated with and even more with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and his running of the Bangkok Municipality, but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was definitely against the Communists and therefore at this stage it was essential that they work together. I asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whether he had any suspicions about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and his attitude towards Communism; he said that he did not and that he would be ready to accept candidates put forth by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as long as they were not Communists. While we both recognized the problems posed by corruption in government and the useful tool this provided the Communist propaganda, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] point was that in the present circumstances, with the Communist threat paramount, some things would have to be accepted which he believed would probably later be corrected once there was a functioning representative government under the Constitution. I made clear to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that my government would have the most serious doubts about seeming to be put in a position of supporting one group in the government, however secretly this was done, against another group. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] insisted that it was his and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] purpose to work with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the others and to maintain the unity of the present governing group; the dangers of a division were very clear to them. I remarked that I did not believe [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were in very close and frequent contact but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] insisted nevertheless that they would remain together and work together through the election and the formation of a government under the Constitution.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also said he was prepared to work with other non-Communist parties if they so wished, and he specifically mentioned Seni Pramoj and the Democratic Party. In passing he also mentioned in confidence that he had recently acquired indirectly the newspaper, Prachathipatai.

I confirmed to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that I was aware of previous conversations about secret assistance from the US in connection with the election and that I fully understood its highly confidential nature. Should we proceed my position would be like that of Ambassador Martin, namely that I would deny any reports of assistance and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that he would, of course, be obliged to do the same. He went on to say that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with whom he had recently discussed this matter, was reluctant about proceeding further in discussions with the Americans about this type of assistance. He told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that he was afraid the Americans will meddle in Thai matters and even ask to run the show. Nevertheless, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had persuaded him to agree that the matter should be taken up with me. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] himself was not prepared to put up the very substantial funds which might be involved and he does not want to approach businessmen on this matter since they would probably expect some quid-pro-quo for any assistance rendered. On the other hand, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said, the Americans and Thais both have a deep interest in assuring that the Communists do not take over in Thailand and American help is certainly justified when you consider the considerable direct assistance rendered to the Communists by the Communist nations.

I said that while my governmentʼs receptiveness of this matter was already known, Washington would naturally wish to know the kinds of things the funds were to be used for, and to have a general idea of the strategy to be followed, the kind of party to be formed, and the principal individuals involved. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said what they had in mind were funds to finance campaign expenses. He mentioned posters, printing expenses, costs of travel and holding meetings, and the like. He thought that this would not exceed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dollars earlier mentioned. He said that they did not have in mind handouts to candidates in the manner of General Phao some years ago, but rather assistance to candidates to enable them to campaign effectively. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] then said that he was not prepared to go into detail about their plans and projected organization and all of the persons to be involved. He said that the US should be prepared to take “our word”—presumably meaning his and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If we have confidence in them we should be ready to go ahead but the Thais are not prepared to put all of their plans and projects up for detailed examination and approval, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said.

I replied that my government would have no intention of running the elections in Thailand and accepted without question that this was a matter for Thai decision. Nevertheless, it made sense for us to discuss questions of party organization, the conduct of a campaign, etc. While we recognize the Thai situation as different from others, nevertheless we had had a good deal of experience around the world and could call attention to the way in which problems have been met elsewhere, which might be usefully adapted to Thailandʼs circumstances. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] did not reply to this but returned to his earlier point and said that if we insisted on a detailed review of the Thai plans and projected actions, it might be best to drop any idea of American assistance. I only observed that I would have the opportunity to talk with the Secretary of the State and Mr. Bundy in Wellington and that I would plan to meet promptly with him again as soon as I returned.

(Note: Several hours after our discussion [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] telephoned me and in guarded language he made the point that he personally would expect to keep me well informed about the formation of a government party and the organization and conduct of its campaign. He insisted, however, that it was out of the question to sit down in groups with others present to discuss such matters. I took this to mean that he was retreating somewhat from his adamant position during our earlier conversation.)

In the course of our discussion [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also stated that he insisted that Chamnan, as the official responsible, conduct the elections in a fair and open manner and that he must avoid supporting individual candidates at the same time that he is carrying out his official responsibilities. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said this in such a way as to suggest that he realized some things not quite kosher might be going on behind the scenes but it was essential that Chamnanʼs public posture be absolutely correct.) In this connection again, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said also that his participation in the whole election procedure will come promptly to an end if illegal or dishonest actions are taken.

On timing of the elections, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that promulgation should not take place before the end of May or early June so that the elections would come after the first of the year when the harvest has been completed. Otherwise, farmers, who after all make up the bulk of the population and its most stable element, will not participate as fully and there will be charges of bad faith. Unfortunately, Prince Wan made an off-the-cuff statement about the Royal Astrologer being responsible for setting the date and the King feels that this has now put him on the spot and obliged him to speak for the earliest possible date, namely sometime in April. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] seemed confident, nevertheless, that it will be possible to shift the date for promulgation to later in the spring.

Our conversation was brought to a close because of pressmen waiting for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at his weekly press conference and we agreed to meet and talk again once more before my departure for Wellington. In taking my leave I said once more that the US does appreciate the need for assistance and, as Ambassador Martin stated some time ago, is ready to help. We do need to know what the funds will be used for and above all, we must know that our support goes to a party or movement representing the entire present leadership, not just one group. We also feel that our experience elsewhere could be useful in some cases for application, as adapted, to some Thai situations. I also mentioned that there would be the question of how funds could be released, but we agreed to return to that matter later.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified], in answer to my question, had asked me not to raise this matter with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whom I expect to see on Monday morning. During his later telephone call (see Note above) he did, however, say that on second thought he believed I should mention our conversation to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and indicate that the latter need not be concerned about the consequences of the provision of help by the US.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Unger. Copies sent Eyes Only to Hannah, Jantzen, Hamilton, and Bundy.
2. Unger and [text not declassified] resumed their conversation of March 24 at 9 p.m. They discussed the need for a Thai government party that represented the entire Thai leadership and how to include younger Thai civilians in it. (Ibid.)