Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, December 14, 1967, 1250Z.

7415. Subject SOFA. Ref: Bangkok 6985.²

1. Departmentʼs urgent and high level attention is invited to FTB–11, 973³ which clearly draws the lines of the impasse we have reached in SOFA negotiations and emphasizes the absolute necessity that we be placed in a position to reopen negotiations with the RTG before Christmas even if only on the subject of jurisdiction. While I must emphasize the extreme sensitivity of the RTB report, compromise of which would have grave consequences, yet I believe it is essential that the key personnel in Washington concerned with the SOFA be fully apprised of the substance thereof in order that they will be able to approach their task with an understanding of the seriousness of the local situation.

2. In general, the report bears out all that we have been reporting in a series of Embassy telegrams numbers 6082, 6083, 6616, 6617, 6618 and 6985, plus another sent through a separate channel, DTG 281328Z.⁴ The following points are worthy of special note:

A. The memorandum to the Thai Cabinet was submitted by the Ministry of Defense which has consistently adopted a more cooperative attitude on this subject than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This in itself is a measure of the much stronger attitude which we can judge will be taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon his return from medical treatment in New York.

B. All the specific numbered points in the Defense memorandum have been discussed in various SOFA negotiating sessions and reported on different occasions. Some will appear to be of relatively minor importance, and we believe that they can be negotiated. Others are clearly issues on which the Thai Government will insist.

C. Point 3 in Defense memorandum deals with jurisdiction. We believe this point can be successfully negotiated with the Thai on the basis of a NATO style formula (with certain Philippine modifications) as outlined in my conversation with Thanat reported reftel. However, it is essential that we move quickly at least on this point. Shortly before his departure, Thanat said he would send Sompong back from New York to resume talks on this subject. Sompong has returned. We think it is clearly important that we be able to provide a draft proposed jurisdiction article to the Thai before Christmas as was stated in embassy message 281328Z.

D. Point 5 of the Defense memorandum deals in effect with Article X of the U.S. draft and succinctly sets forth the Thai view that the U.S. proposals regarding facilities and areas are tantamount to converting the U.S. use of Thai bases into a U.S. base system which the Thai regard as “undercutting the independence of Thailand.)

E. Point 9 of the Defense memorandum proposes that “In the future Thai officials deal strictly with American troops committing offenses so that the U.S. finds out what the position of American troops is, if there is no status agreement.” It will be noted that following Cabinet discussion “The Cabinet instructed Thai officials concerned in this matter to deal strictly with American troops guilty of malfeasance in Thailand.” We interpret this to mean that the Thai will at some early date claim and apply Thai jurisdiction to at least some selected cases. As indicated in previous telegrams, under such circumstances we do not believe that the Thai assumption of jurisdiction can be avoided by pleading the 1950 Military Assistance Agreement (except, of course, in the case of JUSMAG personnel).

3. Unfortunately, it would appear that Thanat has not sufficiently circulated among his colleagues before his departure the substance of our conversation reported in reftel. It would appear that the members of the Cabinet at this meeting had no knowledge of it. Moreover, we learned today that the chief military member of the Thai negotiating team, Judge Advocate General of Ministry of Defense, had no knowledge of that conversation nor did the supreme command. We are, however, taking steps to ensure that the appropriate authorities are advised.

4. In the light of the foregoing, I must reiterate my previous urgent request that Washington authorize us to give the Thai before Christmas a revised draft jurisdiction proposal along the lines of my conversation with Thanat and the draft text which we forwarded November 28. I believe this is essential to re-establish with the RTG our sincerity of purpose and to follow up on my conversation with Thanat by demonstrating that our approach has actually changed. We do not mean to negotiate a separate jurisdiction agreement at this time but rather to give the Thai a new jurisdiction text to study while we are completing a new text of the remaining articles.

5. In handing jurisdiction text to Thai we would explain that while there are no proposed agreed minutes we would, of course, expect to record in the negotiating record our mutual understandings regarding various details, such as duty certification, custody arrangements, etc.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–3 THAI–US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 6985, December 6, Unger reported on a conversation of December 5 he had with Thanat on the status of forces negotiations. Unger reported that he had obtained Thanatʼs agreement to a new, shorter draft SOFA without agreed minutes which used the NATO-Netherlands waiver formula for most sensitive jurisdiction questions. (Ibid.)
3. This report summarized a memorandum from the Thai Ministry of Defense to the Cabinet on the SOF negotiations.
4. Telegrams 6082 and 6083 from Bangkok, both November 16, are in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–3 THAI–US. Regarding telegrams 6616, 6617, and 6618, see footnote 2, Document 371. Telegram DTG 281328Z from Bangkok, November 28, is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–3 THAI–US.