372. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Speedup in deployment of additional Thai troops to Vietnam
We have gone thoroughly into the possibility of a speedup in the movement of Thai troops to Vietnam. The schedule of the deployment of the first group (about 6,000 men) has been advanced from August to July. The remainder are scheduled to be in Vietnam by January 1969.
[Page 829]- 1.
- We looked into the possibility of compressing this schedule and
found the following:
- —Our military consider the schedule about as short as it can be if the units are to meet professional standards.
- —The creation of an expeditionary force of over 10,000 men is a really major undertaking for the Thai military. They will be hard put to it to perform on the present schedule, much less on a shortened one.
- —The schedule compares favorably with our own performance in similar circumstances (the creation of a new unit around a cadre of trained officers and NCOs). It takes us about a year from decision to deployment (e.g. the 9th Division now fighting in the Delta area).
- —If we were to pressure them into sending half-trained units there is a real possibility that the units would get involved in a bloody disaster, with the worst possible effect on US-Thai relations.
- 2.
- We also looked into the possibility of sending existing and MAP-equipped Thai battalions to Vietnam
after an intensive but short training period. The trouble with this
approach is:
- —The Thai Government and the Thai King are publicly and emotionally committed to the volunteer concept. They are in concrete on this, and have our approval for it. The use of existing units is therefore not a political possibility.
- —Moreover, it is the judgment of our military people that there are no Thai battalions which could be deployed to Vietnam without a rather extended training period and without some re-equipping. The savings of time would, therefore, be slight.
- —Finally, to take the two best professional battalions out of Thailand would greatly compound the already large problem of finding the cadre around which to build the 10,000 men expeditionary force.
- 3.
- Another possibility is to move the unit into Vietnam as quickly as possible and complete the training cycle on the ground. The Thai themselves like this idea, and would like to deploy the forces to Vietnam in June for final training.2 In the past, MACV has had reservations about completing the formal training cycle in Vietnam. We will raise this again with MACV.
On balance, I am now convinced that we should work for a June or July deployment and concentrate our efforts on making certain that there is no slippage. If training in Vietnam works out, we should be able to get the second group into Vietnam before the end of 1968. I have taken steps to make certain that we get the needed equipment and personnel where they ought to be, when they ought to be there. The Thai themselves are very anxious for an early deployment and feel with some justification that they are making a maximum effort.