Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

236. Telegram From the White House to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) in Texas¹

Washington, May 29, 1968.

CAP 81159. Message to the ranch. Personal for Rostow from Bundy.

1. For the Presidentʼs meeting with Gorton tomorrow,² and continuing discussion of Cambodia, you should have the following background for such use as you see fit in briefing the President:

A. President went over situation at last meeting with Gorton,³ explaining it on the map and quoting from Bunkerʼs cable recommending authority for action.⁴

B. Specifically on the tri-border area, the Australians transmitted for us some evidence concerning the area in February. This consisted of visual sighting by our own patrols (not attributed), plus some photographs. These materials showed roads and one new small bridge, plus some rather scratchy fox holes—but nothing really impressive by way of a fixed installation or clear proof of present occupancy.

C. Since February, we have received additional material mostly photographs. However, in view of Sihanoukʼs reaction to the February package (reported by the Australians) that photographs by themselves did not show where they were taken and in view of the fact that the evidence showed only somewhat clearer roads, it did not seem to us then—and does not now—that this evidence would add much to what we have done. Finally, photographic evidence runs the risk of triggering Sihanoukʼs reaction that we are violating his air space.

D. At the present moment, we are awaiting a MACV officer who is supposed to be bringing the very latest evidence. It may be that Westy himself will have this with him, and that this will be more convincing than what we have hitherto been able to pull together.

E. Perhaps more to the present point, Sihanouk was well aware in November of the Dakto engagement and our clear belief that the NVA/VC went into the tri-border area afterward. During the Bowles visit, Phil Habib expressly included this in the briefing given to Sihanouk, and used arrows to show NVA/VC forces moving into the area in November.

2. You will note that para B in our possible message⁵ would put the message in the mouth of the Australians and would avoid a direct message of warning from us. At the same time its import would be wholly clear to the Cambodians. We feel here that any direct warning from us would have a decidedly negative effect on Sihanoukʼs reaction if the matter comes to a head. On the other hand, Gorton might well feel that we were asking the Australians to serve as our stalking horses—and might have reservations about going this far. Both we and the Australians value their continued presence and effectiveness in Cambodia, and if Gorton were to react that this was putting him out on a limb, we frankly doubt if he should be put under strong pressure to do it. However, this is clearly for the President to judge.

3. Lest anyone think this is State Department soft-headedness, I went over the matter this morning with Bill Depuy and DOD. Bill at least has reservations even about submitting a new package, on the present state of our evidence, and unless Westy has something more convincing. At the same time, he, and above all General Wheeler, obviously wish to act strongly if the case arises. Our own views on what we do in the military sphere were covered in Nickʼs memorandum to the President of this noon.⁶ In sum, we all agree that we should be prepared to act, and this is the gut issue. The only question, for the Presidentʼs conversation with Gorton, is whether any message other than a possible new package of evidence would in fact be useful in tempering Sihanoukʼs reaction or deterring the North Vietnamese. We ourselves doubt that it would be helpful and have some fear that it would be harmful. But the separate message gives you what the President could say if this is his judgement.

4. One final point. Bunkerʼs cable has referred to Sihanoukʼs remarks to Bowles about not objecting to military action in hot pursuit in unpopulated areas. It is quite correct that Sihanouk told Bowles he would “shut his eyes” in this situation. This gives us some basis for believing that his reaction would be moderate at most. However—again thinking in terms of any message through the Australians—it would be my very strong judgement that it would be a great mistake for the Australians to refer in any way to this statement by Sihanouk. Again, we can act on it, but if we throw it back at him it would be a red flag to a bull. One can seldom have confident judgements about Sihanoukʼs reaction, but this one is as clear as anything can be in my mind.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Miscellaneous Cables and Memos, 1/67–12/68. Secret. Received at the Johnson Ranch at 8:25 p.m. CST.
2. President Johnson, Prime Minister Gorton, General Westmoreland, Rostow, and others spent the day at the Johnson Ranch. There was a press conference, a lunch, and sightseeing. There were no apparent substantive discussions or meetings, although Gorton and Johnson would have had ample time to talk. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary)
3. See footnote 2, Document 235.
4. See footnote 3, Document 234.
5. See Document 237.
6. Apparent reference to Document 237.