Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

234. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, May 27, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Special Fire Authority Against VC/NVA in Cambodia

1. At Tab A is a request by General Westmoreland for authority to employ B 52ʼs, tactical air, and artillery against VC/NVA in the tri-border area of Cambodia in the near future to exploit the expected defeat of a major NVA offensive against the Central Highlands of SVN.² Tab B is a strong endorsement from Ambassador Bunker.³

2. We expect this matter to be discussed at the Presidentʼs meeting at 8:30 AM May 28.⁴

Discussion

3. General Westmoreland points out that B–3 front forces are out from their Cambodian tri-border sanctuary and into Kontum Province in the II Corps Tactical Zone. In his judgment, a major battle is imminent, and may in fact have begun. Enemy forces consist of the 325 C and 1st NVA Divisions supported by the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. Based on current intelligence and past enemy performances, General Westmoreland has outlined a scenario in which the NVA objective is Kontum City. He posits an enemy defeat and withdrawal under pressure along known routes into his sanctuary in Cambodia. To take maximum advantage of the situation and prevent renewal of attacks, General Westmoreland proposes to pursue by B 52ʼs, tactical air, and artillery along retreat routes and against known targets in the tri-border area of Cambodia North and East of YB 6100 (see map⁵). Combat timing is such that he needs advance authority, which he would use only if the scenario develops as outlined. If used, notification will be made prior to beginning the cross-border attacks.

4. Ambassador Bunker in recognizing the political implications argues that increased enemy activity since January 30 and the military and psychological dangers to our position in SVN and at Paris dictate inflicting maximum punishment on the enemy. To give the enemy his tri-border sanctuary, would permit him to come out again, thereby possibly prolonging enemy hopes, the war, casualties, and negotiations.

5. We do not yet have CINCPAC or JCS views. We are advised that General Wheeler strongly supports Westmorelandʼs proposals and will vigorously endorse them tomorrow, citing enemy mass, fewer friendly forces in the area than six months ago when a similar request was rejected, and the need to correct the ground disparity by B 52ʼs.

6. Although the area concerned is remote, rugged, and unpopulated, we can expect the operation to receive publicity and public denunciations by Sihanouk (despite an earlier statement that he would not mind “hot pursuit” into unpopulated areas). We think it unlikely North Viet-Nam would break off the talks, although they probably would threaten to do so—it is unlikely they would acknowledge presence of their forces in Cambodia.

7. Our reservations concern whether the targets will be sufficiently remunerative to justify the political risks and whether they could be taken by Tac Air and artillery without the use of B 52ʼs. You may wish to have a full discussion of both points. If the case is made on each, we would support Westmorelandʼs proposal and his rationale. Westmoreland expects that the battle for Kontum may last a month, and in view of the Paris talks, we believe we should reassess the situation before the cross-border phase is initiated.

Recommendation⁶

8. That, depending on the consideration outlined in para 7 above, you approve for planning purposes the proposal to employ B 52ʼs, tactical air, and artillery against NVA forces in the tri-border area of Cambodia as outlined in the scenario.

9. That the actual execution of the cross-border phase be subject to Washington review based upon the situation obtaining at the time, principally the Paris talks, and prior to an Execute order.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CAMB. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Cowherd and Leonhart.
2. COMUSMACV telegram 14988/250450Z May 1968, attached but not printed.
3. Telegram 28267 from Saigon, May 25, attached but not printed.
4. President Johnson held a breakfast meeting at 8:30 a.m., May 28, attended by Clifford, Taylor, Vance, Wheeler, Helms, USIA Director Leonard Marks, Christian, Rostow, World Bank President McNamara, Justice Abe Fortas, Katzenbach, and Tom Johnson. Australian Prime Minister Gorton joined the meeting at its end. According to Tom Johnsonʼs notes of the meeting, the only discussion on Cambodia was Vanceʼs statement that “We should stay away from talks about Cambodia.” (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings) Johnsonʼs notes are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume VI.
5. Not attached.
6. There is no indication on the source text of Ruskʼs approval or disapproval of paragraphs 8 and 9. Bundy wrote the following note next to the approval lines: “I am somewhat more reserved, but this gives the facts.”