221. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Violation of Cambodian Borders
I well remember the horror felt throughout the civilized world when in 1914 the Kaiser violated the neutrality of Belgium. Of course the present situation in Cambodia as we see it is very different from Belgium in 1914. But the world at large (and a substantial section of the American [Page 489] public) has not yet been presented with convincing evidence that expanding the war into “a tiny, helpless country” is justified.
The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces do in fact have bases and rest areas at several points along the jungle covered, poorly defined border of Cambodia. Some of those areas seem to straddle the border, some are entirely within, by several kilometers, Cambodia itself. It is worth noting, however, that neither air attacks nor ground sweeps (within South Vietnam itself) have eliminated Viet Cong jungle bases; nothing short of actual occupation of the territory would seem to be able to accomplish this.
We do not as yet have evidence that would convince a skeptic that Cambodian territory is regularly being used as a sanctuary by the Viet Cong in the sense that the Viet Cong are staging substantial unit attacks directly from Cambodia and retiring into Cambodia immediately after the engagements. The evidence that we do have (and most of this comes from sources that could not be revealed) demonstrates only that for periods, sometimes of considerable length before engagement, some of the units involved were reinforced and refitted in Cambodia but that most of these units were redeployed into South Vietnam well before the engagement began.
I am impressed by the “personal message” of December 12, from Australian Foreign Minister Paul Hasluck to the Secretary:
“If the Allied forces in Viet Nam move militarily against … Cambodian territory, even in hot pursuit, the area of hostilities will have been widened. The Government of Cambodia itself will become involved, and it will charge the United States with aggression and will bring the matter before the United Nations … there will be little sympathy and support in the United Nations for any such Allied action. It is very difficult to get the facts across and accepted either in the United Nations or inside individual countries, and in both the United States and Australia there would be great sympathy for Cambodia even from those who hitherto have been lending their support to our policies … . International opinion, and opinion in our own countries, while in a sense intangible, could become a very material factor working against a successful outcome for our efforts in Vietnam.
“Furthermore, instead of our fighting being confined to South Vietnam, we may find a much bigger area of operations has developed in Cambodia requiring the deployment of forces and making other material demands. It is important that, before any decision is made to expand hostilities, both sides of the equation be brought into the balance—the new demands that will be made on our men and resources no less than the opportunities for action against communist military forces.”
We are currently in the midst of a political-diplomatic campaign to induce the Cambodians to do what they can to discourage Viet Cong use of their territory. On November 26, Prince Sihanouk publicly stated that he would welcome strengthening the ICC with helicopters. On December [Page 490] 4, the Australians delivered a United States note to Sihanouk indicating our concern over Viet Cong use of his territory and our willingness to assist him in preserving his neutrality plus a summary of our evidence of such Viet Cong use.2 While we have received no direct response to that message the absence of vehement denial may itself be significant. We are in the process of sending Sihanouk a note explicitly responding to his November 26 statement and offering two helicopters and related funding to the Cambodian ICC. In anticipation of the probable need to increase the pressure on Sihanouk, we have already prepared the American Embassies in a number of countries which may have influence with Cambodia to present the documentation of our concern to their host nations and to request that they take it up with the Cambodians. If this proves unsuccessful we would then begin to present to the public our efforts to preserve Cambodian neutrality and the details of violations of that neutrality by the Viet Cong.
Until the conclusion of this diplomatic campaign and until we have publicly presented convincing evidence of Viet Cong violations of Cambodian neutrality, we should not consider any action in Cambodia that would be an obvious intentional violation of its borders. I greatly fear that such violation will not bring us any meaningful advantages but will decrease our support both at home and abroad and cause very troublesome problems at the United Nations. We should of course continue and perhaps consider augmentation of reconnaissance and information-gathering activities in Cambodia.
Therefore, I specifically recommend disapproval of General Westmorelandʼs proposal that he be authorized to subject a portion of Cambodian territory to 72 hours of B–52 and tactical air strikes.3 In addition steps should be taken to prevent ARVN forces from crossing the Cambodian border in hot pursuit. The major political difficulties that would result from either move should preclude such action at this time.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Miscellaneous Memos and Cables, 1/67–12/68. Top Secret; Nodis. Also sent to Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on December 16, noting Harrimanʼs “deep opposition to military action” and his urging of diplomatic action via the ICC. Rostow stated that if renewed ICC action failed, a campaign to educate the public should be undertaken. Only after these steps were taken, should American military power be taken in violation of Cambodiaʼs borders. Rostow observed that, “at the moment he [Harriman] is supporting the track we are on.”↩
- See Document 212.↩
- See Document 213.↩