213. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1
MAC J00 40588. 1. (TS) Admiral Sharp and I have discussed the enemy situation in the tri-border area and he concurs that action as recommended below should be taken.
2. (TS) We are receiving increasing hard intelligence of enemy force concentrations in the Cambodian “peninsula” of the tri-border area west of Dak To. Generally, the observed NVA presence encompasses all of the Cambodian peninsula north and east of YB6200. We have firm indications that the 1st NVA Div HQ is now located at YB675110, with the 32d, 66th and 174th Regts dispersed throughout the peninsula recovering from the severe beating given them over the past few weeks.
3. (TS) Reports state that enemy units are not disposed in an alert or defensive posture; rather, they are utilizing their Cambodian sanctuary to rest, regroup and reconstitute openly and unmolested. There is no evidence of heavy bunker construction, we believe that the motorable road and bridges at YB736212 and YB736208 are of prime importance to the NVA in the movement of supplies out of Base Area 609 into South Vietnam.
4. (TS) The situation as outlined above, presents a unique opportunity for pursuit by fire. The area is remote; the border is ill-defined; there are no known civilians in the area or Cambodian presence; the delivery of fire easily concealed from scrutiny; and more significantly, the enemyʼs dangerous activities fulfill all the criteria for substantiating the hot pursuit concept. Strike Teams on Station will provide for observation of fire and reports of enemy locations, reaction and subsequent movement.
5. (TS) Request earliest approval to attack this concentration of enemy force by fire employing B–52 strikes for sustained period of at least 72 hours, high intensity TAC air strikes are particularly urged since exposure of this action would be minimal, and this weapons system will provide maximum surprise and shock effect. B–52 strikes only at night would be acceptable.
6. (TS) There are two aspects of this request which I recognize as sensitive. First, the timing may be considered poor because of the efforts [Page 470] which we are right now making to confront Sihanouk with evidence of NVA use of Cambodia. Secondly, B–52 strikes will leave a clear signature in Cambodian territory. However, I feel strongly that the opportunity which exists is sufficiently important that it should be exploited now, and if necessary explain our actions as hot pursuit by fire in an uninhabited area. The key point is to strike this concentration expeditiously and with full force if we are to gain maximum advantage.
7. (U) Amb. Bunker has read this message and concurs.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (1)a, 5/66–1/68, Cambodia. Top Secret; Limdis; Exclusive for Wheeler. Repeated to Rusk, McNamara, and Sharp. This telegram was retyped in the White House and used at a lunch-eon meeting on December 5; for a record of the meeting, see Document 214; and apparently referred to at the meeting of 6:02 p.m. of December 5, see Document 216.↩