200. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denny) to Secretary of State Rusk 1
SUBJECT
- SNIE 57–67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort2
The attached Special National Intelligence Estimate assesses the nature and the extent of Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory in support of Communist military operations in South Vietnam. The estimate was requested by the SEACOORD ambassadors, following their meeting in Saigon last November. Drawing on a MACV intelligence study, “The Role of Cambodia in the NVN/VC War Effort,”3 which was prepared a month previously and served as the basis of their briefing by General Westmorelandʼs intelligence officers, the SEACOORD ambassadors concluded that Communist use of Cambodia “is growing in magnitude” and cited MACVʼs view that our “tolerance level” of refusing to expand the fighting into Cambodia “is being reached.” Finally, SEACOORD proposed, pending “confirmation of the magnitude and seriousness of the problem” by the intelligence community estimate, a number of specific actions to discourage Communist use of Cambodia and to expand our intelligence assets on the problem.
Utilizing intelligence from all sources, as well as the MACV study of last year, the estimate deals with Communist use of Cambodia for sanctuary, infiltration, and logistical support, the extent of official Cambodian involvement, as well as the RKGʼs ability to counter Communist efforts through Cambodia. It also attempts to assess Communist alternatives to the use of Cambodian territory in the event that Cambodian rice were denied the insurgents.
The estimate concludes that, while Communist use of Cambodian territory has increased substantially during the past 18 months and will probably continue to do so as a result of increased requirements created both by their own military build-up and intensified military operations by allied forces, denial of Cambodian territory to the Viet Cong “would not constitute a decisive element in their ability to conduct military operations,” even though it would make life more difficult for them. Regarding the RKGʼs ability to restrict Viet Cong use of Cambodia, the estimate concludes that “Cambodiaʼs capability to detect and resist sizable [Page 434] Communist forces or inhibit Communist activities, particularly in the northeast, is extremely limited.” However, it notes that Sihanouk is probably aware of the general nature but not the full extent of Communist activities in Cambodia and that his own attitude has fostered a permissive atmosphere for collusion by officials and private commercial interests. The estimate also makes the judgment that Sihanouk could do more than he is now doing to discourage the Viet Cong, but because of Cambodian military limitations, fear of involvement in the war, and Sihanoukʼs belief that in the long run he will have to deal with the Communists, Sihanoukʼs efforts during 1967 to control Communist use of Cambodia “will be minor and ineffectual.”
In sum, the principal judgments in this estimate are (1) that Communist use of Cambodian territory is not decisive to the Communist military effort in South Vietnam and (2) that the RKG is neither willing nor able to restrict substantially the use of its territory. On the basis of these judgments, therefore, the estimate does not appear to support the tone and implications of the MACV study. Indeed, in its own thorough review and evaluation of the MACV study, CIA has concluded that the MACV study (1) failed to discriminate sufficiently in the use of raw intelligence reports and (2) overstated the significance of Cambodia to Communist military operations in South Vietnam. We agree with CIA on these points.
Despite the estimateʼs divergence with MACV, it is worth noting that the DOD representatives had no major difficulties with it. Indeed, there was considerable consensus among all representatives on the high-lights of the estimate. At one point, DIA threatened to reserve its position over the amount of rice estimated to have been delivered from Cambodia to Communist forces in the central Vietnamese highlands and in the southern Laos panhandle, but later accepted compromise wording on this portion of the estimate.
Finally, the conclusion that the Viet Cong in certain areas would probably have to rely on major shipments of rice from North Vietnam if Cambodia were no longer a source is, in our judgment, somewhat overdrawn since we are not at all confident that sources within South Vietnam could not make up the gap or that rice from these sources could be effectively denied the insurgents.
- Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 57–67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limited Distribution.↩
- Document 199.↩
- See Document 194.↩