Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

199. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 57–67

Washington, January 26, 1967.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WAR EFFORT

Conclusions

A. Denying the Communists the use of Cambodian territory and supplies would make life more difficult for them; it would not constitute a decisive element in their ability to conduct military operations in South Vietnam.

B. The availability of Cambodian territory is of considerable psychological and military advantage to the Communists. They use it as sanctuary to evade allied forces and more permanently as a refuge for rest, training, medical care, storage of supplies, and as a convenient and secure route for the infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam.

C. Access to the Cambodian rice surplus has alleviated one of the Communistsʼ most serious logistics problems. Movements of Cambodian rice to the Communists in the South Vietnamese highlands and Laotian Panhandle during 1966, as a result of an official Cambodian sale and some smuggling, could have reached 20,000 tons and possibly more. This quantity more than met the annual consumption requirements of Communist forces in the rice-deficit Vietnamese highlands and the Laotian Panhandle, and obviated any need to move substantial quantities of food down the Laotian route system from North Vietnam.

D. The Communists continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from Cambodia; some of this probably represents unauthorized diversions from the Communist arms now being imported by the Cambodian Government for its own forces. But we have no evidence of large-scale diversions of these arms or of any substantial clandestine movement of arms into Cambodia and thence forward to the Communists in Vietnam. Moreover, its seems unlikely that the Communist command would choose to rely in any major way on such an uncertain and indirect source of arms for its main force units, so long as the overland routes from North Vietnam are available. Some other supplies such as drugs, communications equipment, and chemicals useful in the manufacture of explosives are obtained from Cambodia, but the quantities involved are not critical to the overall Communist effort.

E. During 1967, Communist use of Cambodia will probably continue to increase, as it has over the past 18 months. The principal causes are the logistic burdens imposed on the Communists by their own military buildup and the increasing military pressures imposed by allied forces.

F. Sihanouk is probably aware of the general nature of Communist activities in Cambodia. He has shown some concern that he has leaned too far to the Communist side, and over possible US–GVN counteractions. But Cambodia lacks the military capability to close its 700-mile border with South Vietnam, and any determined effort to do so would run counter to Sihanoukʼs basic aims of avoiding direct involvement in the war, of avoiding too close alignment with the US, and of maintaining cordial relations with the Communists. Thus, we do not foresee any substantial change in Cambodiaʼs posture over the next year toward the war in Vietnam.

[Here follows the Discussion section of the paper.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 57–67. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a covering note, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with its submission except the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds it was outside his jurisdiction.