Office of the Historian

106. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 24, 1964, 12:05–12:33 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Cambodian Neutrality Proposal

PARTICIPANTS

  • The British Ambassador
  • Mr. Nigel Trench, Counselor, British Embassy
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Wm. C. Burdett, Deputy Asst. Secy for European Affairs
  • Mr. H. L. T. Koren, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
[Page 257]

The Ambassador said he thought their draft answer2 to the Soviet proposal for a Cambodian neutrality conference date and place was sufficiently vague that it was not inconsistent with the US position, and would keep Sihanouk happy as well. The Secretary stated once again the US position opposing a conference unless the results expected were understood and agreed to beforehand. He pointed to the experience of the Laos Conference where we were under heavy attack for the first few days simply because there had been no advance agreements. He also emphasized our heavy responsibility in SVN and Thailand. We simply could not ask them to come to a conference clearly aimed at them as this one had been. The chances were practically nil that the US would come to a conference to debate. The Ambassador suggested that in view of Sihanoukʼs vanity and how much depended on indulging that, a short conference would be a small price to pay to keep him happy.

The Secretary said it was first imperative to wait until we could see what results could be obtained and if none could be agreed upon, there would be no conference as far as the US was concerned. He added that if we were going to have trouble with Sihanouk, as we very well might, it would be better to have it now rather than at a conference. The Ambassador remarked again he thought the UK draft safeguarded our position. The Secretary replied that he thought there would have to be more language on the need for a pre-agreement of desired results. The Secretary spoke of very real fear in Viet-Nam of pressure for neutralization and its effect internally. We had too much at stake in Viet-Nam to risk this. Besides we did not have much in the way of relations with Sihanouk and we did not have much to lose. If the results were fully agreed to it should be possible for Ambassadors to sign at Phnom Penh.

The Ambassador asked whether we were adamant on this position because they didnʼt feel that they could stall with the Soviets. The Secretary said that we did not want to draft their reply for them. But we would not come to a conference if the results were not agreed in advance and even then we must take Thai and Vietnamese views and interests into account. We would not even be very happy about just a signing conference.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Confidential. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8. The time of the meeting is from Ruskʼs Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The discussion on Cambodia was part two of three separate topics.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩