Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

105. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, January 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with the British Ambassador, January 24, 1964

The British Ambassador is calling on you to discuss the differences between us on handling the Soviet proposal for a conference on Cambodian neutrality in April.² There is some urgency because the Foreign Office expects a question on this subject to arise in parliament on Monday. The substance of the US position, as set forth in our telegram of yesterday (Tab A),³ was given to Mr. Trench of the British Embassy yesterday afternoon. Upon learning of the differences in our positions, Trench stated that he was under instructions to seek an appointment with you for his Ambassador.

Probable British Position

The Soviet proposal, which has also been passed to Prince Sihanouk, changes the situation and will generate increasing pressures for a conference. The British believe that any indication on their part of turning back now might “set Sihanouk off again.”

US Position

The position already given the British Embassy is that their proposed reply is in effect a commitment to attend a Geneva Conference in April. This is not significantly affected by certain drafting changes which the British have proposed to their own note. It would be ill-advised to talk of the holding of a conference, unless the agenda and subject matter are thoroughly discussed and texts agreed to beforehand by all parties concerned. We proposed that the British tell the Soviets that it is premature to set a date for a conference unless the subject matter is agreed beforehand. We specifically proposed using the co-chairmen machinery to reach agreement on texts, using the British draft. Recognizing that a new British approach to a conference might “set Sihanouk off”, we said it would be better to take this risk now rather than later, when the conference process was even further along and Sihanoukʼs reaction would be more violent.

Recommendation

That you seek to persuade the British Ambassador of the importance that the US and UK coordinate their actions in such a way as to avoid a conference. Our opinion is that the best tactic to achieve this would be our suggestion of utilizing the co-chairmen machinery to obtain agreement of interested countries to neutrality agreements on Cambodia. We would propose that this matter be discussed in more detail with Mr. Peck in the preliminary talks which you suggested in your letter to Mr. Butler. In the meantime, we would hope the British will take no definitive position with respect to the Soviet draft.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Hannah on January 23 and cleared by Harriman. Ruskʼs initials appear on the source text.
2. See Document 106.
3. Telegram 4457 to London, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S) Its contents are summarized below under the heading, “US Position.”