357. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson
1
Washington, October 24, 1967, 3:55
p.m.
Mr. President:
Herewith:
- 1.
-
Marcos complains to
LOCKE,2 claiming we equipped only two
rather than five engineer battalions.
- 2.
- Bill Jorden puts the matter in perspective and advises that no
hasty action required.
I am having the matter looked into carefully.
Since your conversation with him is involved, I thought you’d wish to
know about it right away.
Attachment A
FOR THE PRESIDENT
TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LOCKE (Manila 464)3
In a private conversation with Philippine President Marcos, he said to me:
- A.
- When he was promised in the U.S. equipment for five
engineering battalions then, and probably five later, this
was intended to mean new battalions and was not to include
the three battalions which had previously been equipped by
the U.S. This was made clear in private conversation between
him and you.
- B.
- Later the U.S. Government took the position that the first
five battalions to be equipped included the three previously
equipped so that new equipment for only two, not five, was
secured.
- C.
- He has been embarrassed by this but has “covered up”
publicly, indicating the U.S. has furnished the equipment.
When Speaker Laurel assailed the U.S. in Assembly, claiming
Philippines “short-changed,” Marcos told him to stop his criticism, that
perhaps equipment was not then available.
- D.
- He feels you are not aware of the situation and that
misunderstanding developed at other levels. He has
considered writing you a personal letter, but preferred for
me to get word to you. He wants to know what
happened.
I told President Marcos I had
no information about the matter, but would try to find out.
I discussed the history of the first five battalions with U.S. Charge
d’Affaires in Manila, Jim Wilson. He said:
- A.
- At the time of the agreement there were three U.S.
equipped engineering battalions in the Philippines. These
were not “engineering construction” battalions, which take
far more heavy equipment than plain “engineering”
battalions.
- B.
- Our Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group Chief and
Philippine Chief of Staff had gone over equipment lists
prior to your meeting with Marcos and had agreed on what was necessary
for five “engineering construction” battalions. This was
furnished in full, but the equipment furnished consisted of
a) full equipment for two new battalions; b) construction
equipment necessary to convert the three plain engineering
battalions into three engineering construction
battalions.
- C.
- So far as Wilson knows, the agreement with respect to the
first 5 battalions as then understood by Philippine military
chiefs, was an agreement to furnish 2 completely new
construction engineering battalions and to upgrade the 3
existing plain engineering battalions to construction
engineering battalions. Ambassador Blair had explained all
this some months ago to Ambassador Romualdez, President
Marcos’
brother-in-law, but the Embassy cannot be sure whether or
not Romualdez in fact
explained it in full to President Marcos, although,
subsequently, Marcos
had stated publicly he was satisfied that the commitment had
been met.
It may be that President Marcos mistakenly believes that the original 3
battalions remained the same and that he only received equipment for
2 new battalions. Or it may be he recognizes the facts, but believes
the agreement was to leave the 3 original battalions as plain
engineering battalions and to fully equip 5 new and additional
construction engineering [Page 791]
battalions. He did not mention any difference between plain
engineering battalions and construction engineering battalions and I
doubt that he recognizes that these distinctions figured in the
arrangement. I believe he feels simply that he started with 3
equipped battalions, that he was to get 5 more, which makes 8, and
that he ended with 5 and was therefore “short-changed”.
I believe President Marcos
resents what he believes was a failure of the U.S. to live up to an
agreement he thinks he made personally with you. I believe we should
correct the mistake if one has been made, or explain the fact to
President Marcos personally
if his understanding is wrong. I am sure President Marcos expects me to take this up
personally and directly with you and it is possible that no one in
his own government knows he spoke to me about this, as he did so
privately, even though numerous of his Cabinet Ministers and U.S.
Charge Wilson were waiting in an adjoining room
presumably to discuss other matters with him and me.
President Marcos also
discussed several other matters with me which are covered in detail
in Manila 3760.4 The most important was the
sending of additional help to Vietnam. The President will introduce
the new appropriation for PHILCAG after the elections are over. He will also give
additional help. He cannot politically send troops, and I told him I
was sure we could not pay for an Operation Brotherhood in Vietnam,
which was his choice (additional to, not in place of, PHILCAG). I believe we can get one,
or perhaps even more, Army engineering battalions (which General
Westmoreland prefers to another PHILCAG), for which he will seek appropriations in the
Assembly, if we build for him some roads in the Clark Field area
which could, in his opinion, be justified by military
considerations. He believes the roads would benefit Clark Field and
also increase mobility in the Huk Territory. Foreign Secretary
Ramos is coming to Vietnam
on the 29th, at which time I hope to have detailed discussions
between him and General Westmoreland on the nuts and bolts of the battalions
we want and the roads he wants.5 Embassy Manila is informed and agreeable to this
meeting. I, of course, have not committed U.S. Government in any
way.
[Page 792]
Attachment B
FOR WALT ROSTOW
TEXT OF CABLE FROM WILLIAM
JORDEN (Manila 465)6
You will be receiving promptly a message from Ambassador LOCKE to the
President regarding “misunderstanding” about equipment for
Philippine army construction battalions. Think you will wish to
reassure President that this matter not as critical as might seem at
first blush.
Marcos talked with me about
same matter. I assured him that I would look into it on return to
Washington but I thought there had been no reference to “new”
battalions. President Johnson
had said we would supply equipment for five battalions this year and
would consider doing same for five next year. We had done both.
Marcos seemed fully
satisfied that we would check in good faith and did not push
question. Certainly there is no “misunderstanding” on part of
Americans or Filipinos who worked out details of the equipment deal.
In my opinion, President Marcos is (1) looking for excuse for not doing more
for us in Vietnam; (2) on edge because of rough political campaign
underway here; (3) possibly feeling us out on whether equipment for
another three battalions may not be in the cards. Assure you this is
not of such urgency that it cannot wait until my return. President
said he wanted to see me again before departure and if that works
out I will do all possible to reassure him as to facts.
You will of course wish to ascertain whether our President’s
recollection of this agrees with Marcos concept which might have developed in private
talk. But ensuing negotiations between Filipinos and U.S. strongly
supports view that understanding was as described above.
Separate message from Locke through State channel describes other
aspects of his talk with Marcos.
He is right: Combat troops probably not politically possible—except
as element of U.S. forces and that has obvious drawbacks. On basis
of “volunteers” for U.S. forces we could probably get two divisions,
but that has “mercenary” flavor and other deficiencies.
If we play our cards right, another Philippine Civic Action Group or
engineering battalion is possible. In my opinion, Marcos would accept some compromise
that would recognize his political problems and our common
needs.
[Page 793]
He badly needs some kind of regular briefing on situation in
Vietnam—including growing evidence of problems on the other side.
Jim Wilson agrees this would be desirable and hope something can be
worked out with Ambassador Bunker and Westmoreland. A monthly visit to Manila by Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, J–2 would be valuable, with possible
occasional visit by Westmoreland.
Regarding reference discussions with Secretary Ramos on this matter (paragraph 5 of
cable to State),7 this is not
the best way to approach matter. Any serious talk about this should
be done in Manila or Washington, preferably former. We will get
nowhere on this unless it is with Marcos and his Defense Department.
Talk of U.S. construction contractors is a non-starter, road building
is one thing Filipinos are doing very well on their own.
Take paragraph on Huks with a grain of salt. There are other reasons
for not cracking down.
I have been operating on assumption that full report on my return on
experiences here and Vietnam and observations thereon was preferred
course. If you wish fuller report on these matters earlier, please
inform. This has been damn profitable trip. Regards.
