370. Memorandum From Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Military Policy toward India and Pakistan
We are coming down to the wire on military supply policy toward Pakistan and India. The Bunker/Dean report2 is now in, and the meeting with Secretary Rusk and McNamara will be for the purpose of reviewing their findings.
In sum, they recommend that we undertake a limited and carefully phased program of sale of spares to Pakistan, on rather clear conditions, with carefully phased interpretative initiatives in India.
They propose that in Pakistan Gene Locke enter into very private and exploratory talks with Ayub to see how far he will be willing to go in (a) limiting his relationship with China, and (b) undertaking serious and forthcoming discussions with India on outstanding issues, particularly arms limitation. As we become reassured on these points, we would assist him in finding sources of spares in western markets for his aircraft and other U.S. supplied equipment. Those parts he could not find there we would sell to him directly. The extent and duration of such a policy would depend upon his continued reasonable approach to India, his determination in seeking arms limitation and willingness to limit his supply and political relations with China.
In India, we would make clear that we were examining with Ayub ways to explore arms limitation, his relations with China, and other [Page 721] matters of interest to India. We would also, however, indicate that a small program of the sale of spares was in question. We would reassure the Indians that this did not mean a return to our earlier policy of massive assistance to Pakistan, but represented an effort to retain some influence in Pakistan to improve the chances of a reasonable Pakistan policy towards India and limit China’s penetration into the subcontinent.
If the proposed policy works, in six months we should find that pressures in Pakistan toward a closer Chinese relationship will have been reduced; with considerable luck and a good deal of careful but inconspicuous management, direct and private talks between India and Pakistan will have led to a halt in the arms race and perhaps even a down turn in defense expenditures. The chances that this will be possible are perhaps less than even; but if they succeed, it will be very much to our interest.
On the other hand, we will have become the object of considerable political antagonism in India as Mrs. Gandhi’s opponents on the Left and the Hindu Right both attack her for allowing their Muslim neighbor to receive military supplies from the United States. And we can expect Mrs. Gandhi herself to have to criticize us directly if she is to hold her own in the political scramble. This will adversely affect Congressional attitudes toward aid to India and will make Ambassador Bowles’ position more difficult, but we cannot tell for how long.
There are risks in this policy. The Pakistanis could accept our spares and then resume their earlier adventurist policies toward India—though this is generally conceded to be highly unlikely; our enemies in either India or Pakistan can surface confidential conversations before they have come to fruition, precipitating greater hostility of both against us. Both sides may enter talks and emerge more bitter than ever. The Indian political opposition can so distort our intentions and our actions as to make Mrs. Gandhi’s position more difficult.
But no action also has its obvious costs: Postponing this approach to Ayub until after the Indian election would avoid difficulties for us—and for Mrs. Gandhi—in India. But it would lead Pakistanis to believe we had succumbed to India efforts to veto our policy toward them, would weaken Ayub, strengthen the hand of the more extreme Generals and Airforce Colonels, and generally encourage a more instransigent policy toward India and closer ties with China. It will also make Gene Locke’s problems as a new Ambassador more difficult.
Your Ambassadors differ sharply on what should be done. Ambassador Locke believes he can gain substantial advantages from a policy which is more forthcoming toward Pakistan’s desires than the Dean/Bunker approach; but this will provoke even more difficulties in India than the course proposed. Personal messages to you from your Ambassador [Page 722] and Ayub are attached.3 Most of the Pakistani specialists in town feel Ambassador Locke overstates the advantages to be gained if we follow this course and he somewhat overstates the costs if we do not.
In New Delhi, Mr. Bowles argues that any such course will be bound to create the most profound difficulties for us in India. He believes the political backlash will be virtually impossible to contain. In a number of personal communications, he has strongly expressed his dire fears. India specialists in Washington believe he substantially overstates the liabilities of the proposed course—and also the advantages of choosing India instead of attempting to work with both India and Pakistan, as this proposal seeks to do.
Thus, the policy being recommended by the Department has built-in contention. No one is enthusiastic, except perhaps Ambassador Locke, but it appears to be the least costly policy we can design.
I therefore recommend that you accept the Department’s proposals as set forth in the attached memorandum.4 I would urge the following caveats:
- (1)
- the talks in Pindi should not be started until after the present session of the Indian legislature closes in early September;
- (2)
- Secretary Rusk should be charged with a particular responsibility to monitor these negotiations with especial care to ensure that both Ambassadors follow their delicate instructions with precision.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1966. Secret.↩
- Reference is to an assessment done by Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Arthur Dean of the joint memorandum on military supply policy for India and Pakistan produced by the Departments of State and Defense on August 1; see footnote 2, Document 365. Their assessment, which has not been found, was summarized in greater detail in an August 24 memorandum from Wriggins to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1966)↩
- See Document 369 and footnote 2 thereto.↩
- Not found attached. An apparent reference to the State-Defense memorandum cited in footnote 2 above.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩