365. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan
After lengthy discussions, State and Defense have finally agreed on how to approach the problem of military supplies to Pakistan and India.
Since providing lethal spares to Pakistan will promote difficulties in India for us and for Mrs. Gandhi, and not providing them will create difficulties for us and Ayub in Pakistan, the paper2 does not make a specific recommendation today on whether or not to sell spares for Pakistan now.
Rather, it seeks to put the narrow problem of spares for Pakistan within the much larger and more important issue of getting both India and Pakistan together (or separately) to agree on limiting their defense outlays. It proposes that Gene Locke explore with Ayub how he will limit his relationship with China and enter serious talks to reach agreed arms limitations with India, while we study with him the problem of [Page 711] spares and possible free world, third country sources of indispensable military equipment. Simultaneously, Chet Bowles would make clear we are above all seeking to get the two countries to agree on an arms limitation and to restrain the Pak-ChiCom relationship. But to do this we have to explore with Pakistan their need for spares. This step should help to allay their growing fear of India and give India, Pakistan, and the U.S. time to promote a more active dialogue on agreed arms limitations.
You are, in short, being asked to authorize parallel explorations in both capitals. A final decision on actions to be taken will depend on the results of these explorations.
If they are conducted with finesse and luck is with us, we could make substantial progress. If our political opponents in either country wish to, they could use the mere fact of our explorations to raise some dust. Even starting the explorations will net us sharp criticism in India, as Sig Harrison’s premature story in the Washington Post3 demonstrates.
This approach will keep our hand in the game in Pakistan and may provide one handle for tackling the arms limitation problem. The Indians should not take so desperately seriously a possible U.S. program of roughly $8 million. If their reaction is profound and sustained, we can still decide what to do later on.
Both Secretaries recommend you proceed with this exploratory step, and I concur.
Agree to explore in both Pakistan and India5
See me
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/8/66. Secret.↩
- Reference is to a joint State/Defense memorandum to the President, August 1, entitled “Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan.” (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 9, July 16–31, 1966)↩
- On July 29 Selig Harrison reported that the United States had taken a “guarded first step” toward resuming the supply of spare parts to Pakistan’s armed forces. (Washington Post, July 29, 1966, p. 1)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩
- Neither option is checked.↩