Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Pakistan¹

Washington, September 18, 1965, 6:21 p.m.

83. For Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Your 82.² You should not seek an interview with Ayub, but you should convey clearly to Bhutto, Shoaib and to any others whom you think useful, and who would communicate accurately to Ayub the following:

1. The Chinese ultimatum and the rumors of Chinese troop movements puts Ayub squarely against a critical problem of choice. If he should encourage, or even—by failing to agree to a cease-fire—create the situation that produces Chicom intervention, he will have alienated himself from the West. This is not a threat but a reality. If the Chicoms do intervene,³ the world will place the blame for that action on Ayub’s failure to agree to the cease-fire.

2. At the same time, the threat of Chinese intervention provides Ayub the opportunity to move off his present position of rejecting a cease-fire. He can take the position that the dangers of escalation involved in these Chinese moves make it imperative that the Indo-Pak conflict be stopped. Such a declaration should not result in any loss of face on the part of Pakistan since Pakistan is not threatened directly by the Chicoms. The world would tend to view such action as statesmanlike.

3. At the same time we recognize that the basic causes of the conflict cannot be disregarded. For that reason we are helping to obtain Security Council action calling for India and Pakistan to utilize all peaceful means including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter to bring about a permanent solution of the political problems underlying the conflict and supporting the proposal made by the Secretary General calling for a meeting of the two heads of government including the possibility of using the good offices of the Secretary General and other third parties under the auspices of the UN.

4. While this matter is under consideration in the Security Council, it is of utmost importance that Pakistan put itself in as favorable position as possible in world opinion. India so far has the political advantage because it has unconditionally agreed to the cease-fire. The threat of Chicom escalation affords Ayub the opportunity to move toward the same position without sacrifice of dignity. If he does so, the possibility for serious Security Council action toward a permanent solution of the problem will be greatly enhanced.

5. The Pakistanis will undoubtedly raise with you their wish for U.S. assistance in pushing Indians toward negotiations on Kashmir, and their “need” for some form of U.S. reassurances on continuation of aid. You should say on both of these points that you are without official instructions and that you are concerned⁴ that Washington cannot make any useful comment on these matters until it has some clear indication that Ayub is not casting his lot with Communist Chinese at a moment of decisive importance for the future of the free subcontinent. You should add as your personal opinion that it is your judgment and the judgment of men close to the President, with whom you have been in touch, that once the firing is stopped and President Johnson is convinced that renewed U.S. assistance will be used to help the people of Pakistan and not to support military adventures, you believe that close and mutually helpful relations between the U.S. and Pakistan can quickly be restored. But you should express your absolute conviction that President Johnson is not the sort of man who will ever give his approval to one thin dime for a country which supports or encourages the aggressive pressures of Red China.⁵

For USUN: We would like to have the same position conveyed privately and in confidence by Ambassador Goldberg to Amjad Ali.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Ball, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, New Delhi, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
2. Document 212.
3. Komer told Ball in a telephone conversation on September 19 that the President was pleased to learn that the Chinese had extended the deadline in their ultimatum to September 22. Johnson intimated that the Chinese extension was due to U.S. pressure, an apparent reference to warnings against Chinese involvement in the conflict on the subcontinent passed by Cabot to Wang and by Rusk in his September 15 statement to the press. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Pakistan, 4/1/64–8/16/66)
4. The Embassy was instructed, in telegram 84 to Rawalpindi, September 19, to change “concerned” to “convinced.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)
5. Since Ambassador Ahmed was in New York, Ball and Komer called Pakistani Minister of Embassy Iftikhar Ali off the golf course on September 19 to convey the message outlined in telegram 83. (Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, September 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II; Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Komer, September 19; ibid., Ball Papers, Pakistan, 4/1/64–8/16/66)