212. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State1
82. For immediate personal attention of the Secretary. I flew back Rawalpindi this morning on urgent intimation from Shoaib he needed see me. With new Pak restrictions on activities of all diplomats, he was not supposed to receive me without official being present to record conversation. To evade this he had to telescope private and sensitive part of conversation into about four minutes when we were alone while note-taking officer was being summoned.
His message was to effect that Ayub wants to reject Chinese overtures and come down on U.S. side in confrontation now shaping up. [Page 407] But Ayub must have some high-level U.S. statement which he can use as basis for his decision. Recurring theme voiced by President last night was “Why do U.S. actions seem designed to push me toward the Chinese? I don’t want to sit in Chinese lap, and I won’t do so if it can be avoided. But if U.S. can’t give me any help, I’ll have no choice.”
Shoaib said a “gesture” from the U.S. would be sufficient to turn the tide at this moment. When I pressed him to identify the kind of “gesture” that he had in mind, he indicated that an authoritative U.S. statement attaching responsibility to India for original violation international border on September 6 would suffice. In a vaguer vein he indicated that some U.S. public statement of intention to use its influence to bring about an actual implementation of Kashmir position traditionally taken by U.S., as that position was outlined by Secretary Rusk September 14, would also give President Ayub the basis he feels he needs. Shoaib said he felt that action was required in about next 24 hours, which would point to a relationship between Pak decision and expiry of ChiCom ultimatum to GOI.
With fateful consequences depending on U.S. and Pak decisions next 36 hours, this hasty, incomplete and second-level statement of far-reaching request is not adequate. I urge that I be given instructions by return Flash message from the President to have it out with Ayub as to precisely what he seeks from us and where he stands.
It will be crucially important for me to be instructed as to what if anything I can say by way of private assurances to Ayub that India will be required to show some flexibility in considering a political solution of the Kashmir question, as a condition of any prospective U.S. assistance against Communist China. It is doubtful that Pakistan can be held in line without some assurance to this effect.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to Karachi, and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy to the President at 10:30 a.m. under cover of a note that reads: “This is the despatch I mentioned on the phone.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. V, Cables, 9/65–1/66)↩