213. Editorial Note
During the course of a conversation on September 18, 1965, with Ambassador Goldberg concerning efforts being made by the UN Security Council to bring an end to the conflict in South Asia, President Johnson outlined the U.S. position he wanted emphasized at the United Nations.
Johnson: “We think the Pakistani people ought to have a cease-fire ‘til we can pull this thing—we think India ought to do it. What’s [Page 408] sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Hold the two of them, be equal to both, strictly neutral, pull them together, no threats. But they just can’t afford to have this World War III… . They can’t have that kind of crime around their necks.”
Johnson indicated that he wanted Goldberg to make it very clear that the United States was fully behind the United Nations in its efforts to deal with the crisis.
Later in the conversation, Johnson ruminated about the Kashmir crisis and its bearing on the decision he had to make concerning the provision of grain supplies to offset drought on the subcontinent.
Johnson: “I’ve got to make up my mind whether I’m going to send about 35 million a month in giveaway food to India. And if I do, I’ve got to continue to Pakistan. It runs about 475 million people, it involves about a million tons for every two months. I think that we oughtn’t to be shipping munitions or food or anything else to them while they are in this difficulty. Furthermore, I think until they come here, and we sit down and have an agreement, India’s got 470 million worth of reserves, and there’s no reason why they can’t pay for their wheat if they can pay for munitions. Napoleon said an army fights on its belly, and I don’t see any reason for doing it, although State Department and all the people want us to continue to give away. They say there’ll be a bunch of riots if we don’t. But I think it might be—I don’t know if we got an obligation the rest of our lives just to ship them 10% of what they eat. And not without even having agreement or discussions, or tying in any alliance, or to be sure of serving our national interests. They say if you don’t, they’ll go to Russia. Well, I think it might be a good thing if Russia did a little of it for a while… . But they’re pressing me a good deal, and I’ve got to make a decision in the next few hours.”
Goldberg, in response to the President’s question, advised against cutting off the flow of food to the subcontinent. Instead, he proposed an oil embargo to bring an end to the fighting. Johnson did not respond to Goldberg’s suggestion. He reverted to the decision he had on his desk concerning food for India.
Johnson: “I’m humane, but I don’t have to feed the world. I’ll sell them anything they want to buy. I haven’t got any inherent or constitutional requirement that I know of to furnish it to them ad infinitum. On July 27, I said now I’ll give you a million tons extra, which will give you two months. And you come here and we’ll talk about our national interests and your national interests. That two months is up September 27. This is September 19. [sic] And of that million tons that I gave them on July 27, 630,000 have been shipped to India. The balance will be shipped next month. But additional wheat must be authorized or purchased now if the flow of the pipeline is not to be interrupted, since it takes at least 10 days or two weeks to contract [Page 409] for the wheat. An additional month for ocean transport. We are therefore in a position where delay beyond four or five more days in authorizing an extension of P.L. 480 shipments would mean a break in the supply line and a shortfall of supplies later this fall.”
Near the end of the conversation, Goldberg speculated that, in light of the Indian acceptance of the cease-fire proposal, there was the possibility that a cease-fire could be achieved within the next 48 hours. Johnson therefore concluded that his decision concerning food for India could wait for 2 or 3 days. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m., Tape F65.04, Side A, PNO 1)