Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

215. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, September 19, 1965, 1400Z.

84. Indo-Pak crisis—SC Kashmir. I have just come from private meeting this afternoon with Shoaib, which we arranged at home of mutual Pakistani friend, where we were able to talk freely, escaping restrictions on calls at government offices where in Shoaib’s words, “semi-police state atmosphere now prevails.” Shoaib told me he had a long private session with President last night and he is greatly encouraged by increasing moderation of President’s attitude. He described President as disenchanted with Bhutto’s reckless adventurism, grieved at Pak losses, strongly averse to entering any Chicom association and open to a sensible compromise way out. Shoaib said President growingly aware of Bhutto’s extremism though Bhutto’s job not now in jeopardy. Shoaib said President vetoed Bhutto’s projected trip to New York for current SC session because he felt Bhutto would not show sufficient balance.

Shoaib said much as President wants to compromise issue with India quickly, he cannot give an accounting to the people of Pakistan with nothing to show for the sacrifices entailed. President believes he would fall if he had to admit to failure, and Shoaib agrees with him.

Shoaib said GOP recognized that problem was to find a fair median position on the operative paragraph in SC resolution on Kashmir²—a compromise which both Pakistan and India could live with. He recognized that India could not live with unqualified provision now for plebiscite and withdrawal of all forces from occupied Kashmir. Pakistan could not live with simple cease-fire and freeze in status quo ante.

Shoaib recommendation as minimum alternative which he believes President could buy and then sell to Pak people, is as follows: a provision in operative paragraph of the Security Council resolution which would call for settlement of all principal outstanding issues India and Pakistan, “including Kashmir” or “such as Kashmir.”³ He said Pakistan could accept provision along this line with a mere illustrative reference to Kashmir. He felt confident India could also accept this, since Kashmir had been mentioned before by agreement in joint documents, announcements, and resolutions.

I told Shoaib of my earlier conversation with Bhutto and how far out and unrealistic his proposals were.⁴ I was greatly encouraged to hear of Shoaib’s far more sensible approach, which gives us something to work on which is inside the park at least. I told him I would send off an urgent message on this and would hope the suggestion would provide a new take-off point.

I believe this really modest proposal by Shoaib which undoubtedly has President’s tacit approval, gives us new hope for saving the situation here. It offers the modicum of nourishment which Paks must have to enable them to back off from the brink. I urge its most careful, sympathetic and (for all believers) prayerful consideration.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 12:17 p.m., and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA at 1:10 p.m. Repeated to London, New Delhi, USUN, Karachi, and CINCMEAFSA.
2. Reference is to Resolution 211 adopted by the Security Council on September 20. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 805–806.
3. Resolution 211 included the following language: “Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters.” (Ibid.)
4. McConaughy reported on his conversation with Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed on the morning of September 19 in telegram 85 from Rawalpindi, September 19. McConaughy stated U.S. views as instructed (see Document 214). According to McConaughy, Bhutto’s response was “hard-nosed and disquieting.” He indicated that Pakistan would not agree to a simple cease-fire without some undertaking on the merits of the dispute or some action to liquidate Indian aggression. Bhutto stated categorically that Pakistan had no secret understanding with China, and he denied that the Chinese ultimatum imposed any obligation on Pakistan to accept a cease-fire agreement. He offered Pakistani acceptance of an immediate cease-fire on the basis of an agreement by India and Pakistan to withdraw all their armed forces from Kashmir, an agreement underwritten by the United States. McConaughy said that it was not realistic to put such a proposal forward seriously, and Bhutto responded that it was meant seriously. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INDIA–PAK)