32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Food for Algeria
After much soul-searching, Secretary Rusk recommends a PL 480 Title IV dollar sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria (attached).2 Last February you approved a similar sale. But except for that and a little continuing technical assistance ($125,000), our program in Algeria has been on dead center ever since because of Algeria’s vociferous opposition to our position in Viet Nam.
These political problems remain because the Algerians can’t dissociate their own revolutionary experience from what is going on in Viet Nam today, no matter how often we point out the differences. The large buildup of Soviet weapons there also upsets our friends in Morocco and Tunisia. But if it were not for Viet Nam, we’d be on relatively good terms with this government. It has not caused trouble elsewhere in Africa, and its interests do not cross ours anywhere.
Despite these political differences, we still face the fact that Algeria is potentially one of the half-dozen African powers of tomorrow. When its government becomes more effective, its oil revenues could underwrite substantial development from the already good French base. Its [Page 57] successful revolution gives it the credentials of leadership among the Afro-Asian nations. Its population and army will be among Africa’s largest and strongest.
The main question is whether we want to play for a continuing role there despite its unfriendly public attitude on Viet Nam. The Soviets and French are making a major play for Algeria and would be glad to see us drop out. So far our food has been our blue chip in this game. Now, we must decide whether we will ante up for another round.
Secretary Rusk on balance thinks we should go ahead. Averell Harriman—just back from Algeria—says: “I feel the Algerian government is worth cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam.” (His fuller report on his talks in Algeria is attached to Secretary Rusk’s memo.)3
Apart from the politics, the North Africans suffered a severe drought this year, and Algeria estimated its need at slightly over 900,000 tons of grain. They’ve bought 500,000 tons (400,000 in the US) for cash, and the Soviet Union has offered 200,000. This leaves a gap of slightly over 200,000 which Secretary Rusk recommends we fill.
He would like to go ahead in the next few days so we can negotiate a new agreement before 31 December. First, while Algerian supplies probably would carry the government into the early spring, we have CIA reports indicating that it feels it must make its own arrangements to cover the rest of the gap in the next few weeks for political reasons. Second, he would like to avoid your having to make a determination—which you’ve objected to but which will be required under the new legislation beginning 1 January—that it’s in the national interest to aid Algeria despite its trade in non-strategic goods with Cuba. It will also be easier to negotiate an agreement with the Algerians under the present legislation than under the new because we are not in any position to discuss changes in its own agricultural practices unless we can expand our technical help.
I have to admit I’m torn. I recognize the pain Algeria causes us on Viet Nam, but it’s not in a position to do us much positive harm or good. I also know that rushing to beat the 31 December deadline may not square with your own strenuous effort to shift the food program to harder terms. However, the Algerians have suffered drought and have already bought almost half their requirements here for hard cash, and this concessional sale is repayable in dollars.
[Page 58]Therefore, I recommend looking at this primarily in Algerian terms and lean toward keeping a foot in the door as long as we can do it with mostly dollar sales and a little technical aid.4
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- See Document 31 and footnote 1 thereto.↩
- On February 4, 1967, Rusk sent a follow-up memorandum to the President, urging him to approve the recommendations in his December 20 memorandum. The Secretary said that U.S. lack of response to the Algerian request for P.L. 480 assistance in a year of serious drought was being interpreted by Algeria as an indication of systematic political hostility and might lead it to pursue more radical foreign policies. He argued that it was important that the United States maintain enough of a stake in Algeria to forestall complete Soviet domination. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20)↩
- None of these opinions is checked.↩