31. Memorandum by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman1
MEMORANDUM ON ALGERIA
My impressions gained in Algiers, even in a brief three-day period, are perhaps worth recording as the situation is so complex.
My most extensive talks were with Foreign Minister Bouteflika, a three-hour discussion, and then lunch. I was more impressed with him than I expected to be. He looked me straight in the eye, made his statements quietly but definitely, and has an occasional smile. Ambassador Jernegan told me that he was more direct in his conversation with me than on previous occasions. Usually, Bouteflika appears to be devious. He has a forceful personality, young, confident, and with a good opinion of himself, but he showed willingness to listen attentively. He was critical [Page 55] of US policies on Vietnam, but accepted in return my criticisms of the Algerian Government’s positions.
He emphasized their policy of non-alignment, and claimed to oppose communism, but he considers Algeria has every right to express its opinions on international questions which concern them. We must recognize that he is part of a revolutionary group that has fought hard to win its battle. While he will not give in to pressure, he appeared to be open to reason on some questions. His experience has been largely with revolutionists. He sympathizes with revolutionary movements, although opposing communism. In Algeria, they put their communists in jail, and, in fact, any one else who threatens their one-party regime.
I was unimpressed by Boumediene. He has not a forceful personality. In fact, he gives the impression of a man who has been picked as a figurehead, and used by activists in the background. However, he firmly states the Algerian Government position, but without fervor. I pressed him hard on Soviet arms shipments, to which he replied in a matter of fact manner. I finally got a reaction, however, when I compared Algerian shipments to the large Soviet shipments to Nasser, Iraq, and Syria. He responded vigorously, and took issue with my putting Algeria in the same category as those other Arab countries. Ambassador Jernegan said this was the first time he had seen such an emphatic reaction.
He spoke frankly about Algerian policies, maintained throughout their independence of outside influences, and showed determination to get on with the development of their country, which he believes has vast potentialities.
All in all, although the leaders of the Algerian Government are antagonistic to our policy on Vietnam as they see the conflict as a struggle similar to their own for the independence and unity of the country, I gained the impression that we might be able to work with them in some other fields. Although they consider themselves revolutionaries, they do not appear to have the Ben Bella aggressive designs, nor are they as yet committed to such extreme policies as Nasser. They obviously believe they must hold to their revolutionary posture to maintain control of the party and the country. They are ambitious for the development of their country, but their enthusiasms and confidence are not matched by adequate knowledge or experience.
I feel the Algerian Government is worth while cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam. Considering our past policies of supplying food for relief under Ben Bella, I would recommend that we continue a moderate Title III program and watch developments with the view of increasing our aid if favorable developments occur.
In addition, considering the unusually bad crop this year, I concur in AF’s recommendation for an additional 275,000 ton sale of wheat under [Page 56] Title IV concessional terms. I am not familiar with the amount of grain we now have available, but I would give the Algerian request very much higher priority than UAR.
If we refuse any requests, we should make it plain that our reasons for doing so were not political.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. Attached to a December 20 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President.↩