Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia¹

Washington, September 20, 1966, 2:01 p.m.

50340. Ref: Mogadiscio’s 596² and 651³ (not repeated Paris).

1. We find your talk with Soviet Ambassador Diukarev on arms race in Horn of Africa interesting. As you know, we have believed on basis previous approach to Soviets with regard arms limitation in Middle East that Soviets would probably not be interested in any “Gentleman’s Agreement” on Horn of Africa arms freeze. Still remains to be seen to what extent Diukarev’s proposal was simply tactical probing our position on his part although we inclined agree he would probably not have put forward idea unless it at least consonant with his view of Moscow’s disposition.

2. We, like you, see possible jokers in Soviet Ambassador’s proposal. Moscow may have decided it does not wish provide any more sophisticated equipment to Somali Army and is willing concentrate on insurgency training and secret deliveries of light weapons, at same time obtaining concession from us on US military aid to Ethiopia. This would tie in with recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report that 20 Somalis from Kenya’s Northeast Province had departed by air for 6 months training in USSR.

3. You have pointed out other pitfalls such as possibility Soviets figure arms moratorium would put relatively more strain on US-Ethiopian ties than on Soviet-Somali relations. Military assistance has been a major element in our overall relations with IEG and the cessation of our aid would have to be handled in a fashion in which it would be clear to IEG that it is in its overall interest.

4. Another difficulty in implementing any arms limitation agreement with Soviets in recent IEG request to French for some $10 million worth of tanks and other equipment, outcome of which we have little control over.

5. Difficult conceive how both US and Soviet Governments on basis mutual understanding could cut off fairly sizable ongoing arms programs to Ethiopia and Somalia without consulting governments concerned and persuading them it would be in their interest to accept such proposal. HIM might resist any arms limitation now, insisting that Ethiopia achieve clear preponderance before agreeing to arms freeze. Soviet position vis-a-vis Mogadiscio probably more tenable since quantities of equipment, supplies and ammunition delivered are commensurate with size of present and foreseeable forces. US on other hand considerably short of achieving Ethiopian objectives in vehicles, parts and ammunition. Foregoing could possibly be rationalized depending on degree of routine follow-on support envisaged under Soviet overture, i.e. prohibition on lethal armament but permissive attrition support.

6. Obviously would be preferable if at all possible for Africans themselves take initiative in limiting arms rather than US and Soviets trying impose it on them.

7. On balance, there seems considerable merit your continuing to explore how serious Soviets are re possible arms moratorium in Horn of Africa with your Soviet colleague in Mogadiscio. Of course, we feel it necessary to obtain Emperor’s reaction, at some point, since otherwise we could seriously jeopardize our position in Ethiopia. Certainly we could not afford assume Soviets would not leak this information or that it would not get back to IEG through other sources.

8. Before deciding how to proceed, however, we would appreciate comments from action addressee posts, which should keep in mind President’s interest in new initiatives in Africa as outlined in May 26 speech.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 16; cleared by Lang, Chief of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau’s Political Affairs Division Robert H. Kranich, Hamilton at the White House, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi and repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Paris, and USUN for the Secretary.
2. In telegram 596 from Mogadiscio, September 9, Ambassador Raymond Thurston reported that he discussed the arms race in Africa and how it absorbed the inadequate budgetary and technical resources of these countries with Soviet Ambassador Diukarev, who had asked why the United States had recently given F–5s to Ethiopia. After pointing out the large deliveries of heavy Soviet military equipment to Somalia during the past year, Thurston asked Diukarev if there was anything their two governments could do to stop this escalation. Thurston then suggested a “Gentleman’s Agreement” under which the two countries would agree to supply no more arms to either Ethiopia or Somalia. (Ibid.)
3. Dated September 16. (Ibid.)