Office of the Historian

314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia1

Washington, August 26, 1966, 8:28 p.m.

36666. Ref: Addis Ababa 713,2 6413 and 545.4

1.
Appreciate your comprehensive expose of dilemma and complex difficulties confronting or about to confront us re imminent Ethiopian demands for more military assistance. Moreover you are to be commended for effective presentation U.S. position to Aklilu.
2.
Following is guidance on some of questions you have raised to extent it can be given in advance of receipt Ethiopian request:
a.
Our primary short and long term objectives in Ethiopia are first maintenance Kagnew and second stability of Horn of Africa area including avoidance arms race. (Objectives are in consonance but admittedly means cannot always be.)
b.
We do not wish do anything at this juncture which would in your opinion provoke Ethiopian expectation of payoff in hardware request and thus aggravate arms race in region. This includes requirements for more Kagnew land if you deem preferable postpone this request for time being or if you prefer handle land package (Dept’s CA-994)5 in increments, in which case order of technical priority would be (1) 300 acre easement area, (2) one and half acre conversion to exclusive use, (3) 100 acre exclusive use area adjacent Tract E (which itself acceptable in increments).
c.
If Embassy’s efforts fail dissuade IEG from presenting shopping list (and we suggest you use every opportunity to continue these efforts) we will examine list carefully together with your recommendations and estimates of likely Ethiopian actions in response turndown before making obviously difficult decision. However, we would be very reluctant contribute to further escalation arms race. Moreover apart from problem of Viet Nam priorities, at this juncture we see no probability of any fund increases above planned program.
d.
We would not be prepared nevertheless take lying down Ethiopian “vindictiveness” on international issues, Soviet military assistance and advisors, Viet Nam, etc. After all Ethiopia currently receives well [Page 541] over half of all U.S. military aid to Africa and current plans envisage continuation substantial program. Total AID assistance remains considerable with Ethiopia largest African beneficiary development loans for FY 66.
e.
Re statement on Western support Somali military buildup by economic assistance, presumably you are referring to Italian budgetary support. U.S. programs are limited and exclusively developmental, would not necessarily have otherwise been undertaken by Somalis and thus do not necessarily provide savings to Somali budget but in fact additional charges. Re U.S. assistance to Somali police, amount of arms involved minimal and we recently turned down Somali request for modern weapons for police special force. Whether IEG appreciates it or not, fact is that maintenance of at least some U.S. influence in Somalia remains in Ethiopian interests despite admitted lack success so far in abating tensions and arms race. However, we have not given up and are pleased with your initiative in urging Ethiopian-Somali dialogue to Aklilu. We plan further moves in this direction.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Lang and Herman Kleine, AID Assistant Administrator for Africa; and approved by Palmer.↩
  2. Dated August 19. (Ibid., POL ETH–US)↩
  3. Dated August 15. (Ibid., POL 1 ETH–US)↩
  4. Dated August 9. (Ibid., POL 1 US–VIET S)↩
  5. Dated August 4. (Ibid., DEF 15 ETH–US)↩