Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

218. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, September 12, 1966.

WWR:

SUBJECT

• A New String in our African Bow²

As you well know, prospects for U.S. influence in Africa are cloudy. Level-headedness on black/white issues is likely to resemble indifference. Economic progress will be slow at best. As we continue—and rightly—to devote the largest share of our foreign aid to Asia and Latin America, charges that Africa is of second-class interest to us will become louder.

Of course, we are not without answers. I won’t linger over our assets: strong commitment to racial equality, substantial aid, expanding private investment, influence with the metropoles and international organizations, etc. But I don’t mean to dismiss them. (As you know, I believe that we can steer a course around the most serious traps in Africa.) My thought is to add to those assets, and at the same time to make progress on a very worrisome problem—the dissemination of sophisticated weaponry throughout the continent.

The Arms Problem

It is a well-established myth that there are no arms races in Africa. In fact, arms “contests” have already helped to create a number of very volatile situations—e.g., Ethiopia-Somalia, Morocco-Algeria, Tunisia-Algeria. We have tried to hold weapons deliveries to $25 million—mostly to Ethiopia, Congo, Libya, and Morocco—but even that amount, together with our weapons sales and the much larger Soviet and Chinese programs, results in visible increases in the likelihood and scale of potential conflict. Just as important, sophisticated weapons encourage diversion of pitifully scarce local resources to unproductive military uses.

We know—and the Soviets almost certainly agree on the merits—that supplying sophisticated weapons to African countries is absurd from a security point of view and very dangerous politics. (See attached cable—which arrived as I was dictating this—reporting that the Soviet Ambassador to Somalia has suggested to our Ambassador a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” banning arms to Ethiopia and Somalia.)³ The Chinese don’t agree, but their recent reversals have rendered them less important. Moreover, all other things being equal, the Soviets would probably prefer to buy their influence with economic aid if they could be convinced that we weren’t stealing a march on them in the military area.

An Arms Control Initiative

Suppose, in this context, that the President were to announce a policy of “Safe Conduct for Development” in Africa. Its elements might be the following:

• —U.S. support for an African disarmament conference to develop arms control rules and techniques for enforcing them. (Tanzanian President Nyerere has already mentioned such a conference publicly; with some encouragement, he might formally propose it. It would be important that the proposal come first from an African leader.)
• —Quiet exploration with the Soviets of an agreement to limit arms exports to Africa—excluding the UAR—to small arms. Inspection might be done by the UN.
• —Efforts to get the major countries of Europe to join in putting pressure on the OAU to sponsor the conference and whip its members into line.
• —A hard line on the U.S. or World Bank economic aid to countries who refuse to join and continue to waste scarce resources on arms.

If this approach worked, it might be a model for similar pushes in the rest of the less developed world. If it didn’t, we would have lost very little in a worthy cause. In either event, it would drive home the President’s continuing interest in Africa, add another strand to his peace posture, and dramatize his determination to focus on the real problems of the poor countries. Most important in the short run, it would give us a policy basis for refusing requests for further military aid, which multiply daily.

Procedure

Three possibilities:

1. An immediate Presidential offer to adopt such a policy—perhaps in the UN speech.

2. An entirely private proposal to the Russians of a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” on a few specific countries.

3. A low-key attempt to get Nyerere, Houphouet-Boigny, Kenyatta, and others to call for a disarmament conference, together with a quiet approach to the Russians seeking agreement to support it—or at least not to oppose it.

On balance, I would favor the last of these, followed by a Presidential announcement of our support of the conference proposal. The Africans can be expected to be a bit nervous and suspicious of this enterprise; it will help a great deal if the initiative comes from among their own ranks. More important, their depth of commitment is the basic determinant of success or failure. Whatever route were chosen, the present arms recipients—particularly Haile Selassie—should have some warning and opportunity for reaction. (For an interesting report of HIM’s view of the Nyerere speech, see the attached cable from Korry.)⁴

Timing

The sooner the better, particularly if we move to your line on non-proliferation language. This proposal would be a perfect handmaiden.⁵

EH

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa. Secret.
2. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “E.H./Interesting. What does AF & Red Duggan think? WR.”
3. Telegram 596 from Mogadiscio, September 9; not printed. See footnote 2, Document 315.
4. Telegram 1022 from Addis Ababa, September 11; not printed.
5. On September 15, Hamilton sent a follow-up memorandum to Rostow noting that he had talked to Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Wayne Fredericks who was enthusiastic about the arms control idea provided the Africans proposed it initially. Fredericks suggested sending a special emissary who was trusted by the Africans to talk quietly to a few key heads of state. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa)