94. Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Tweedy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, Department of State (Eisenberg)1
- Developments in the Congo
Confirming the discussion we had in Mr. Fredericks’ office on 23 August, the following are the main points contained in our message from Leopoldville:2
a. Our Station Chief saw [name not declassified] on 23 August, at the latter’s request. [name not declassified] expressed his concern and that of many of his colleagues in the former Ileo government concerning pressures from Gizenga on Prime Minister Adoula. [name not declassified] stated that Gizenga continued to demand concessions which would give the Stanleyville forces control of additional key government slots and [less than 1 line not declassified] Adoula received a phone call from General Lundula on 21 August. Lundula told Adoula that Gizenga demanded Pierre Mulele as the Minister of Defense, Lundula to replace Mobutu as commanding general of the CNA and that Thomas Kanza be named Congolese representative to the UN. When Adoula indicated his inability to comply with Gizenga’s demands, Lundula indicated that the Stanleyville population was preventing Gizenga from coming to Leopoldville. [name not declassified] and presumably Adoula interpreted Lundula’s statement to mean that Gizenga would not come to Leopoldville unless his demands for additional key posts were met.
b. Adoula advised Joseph Kasongo, President of the Chamber, of Gizenga’s demands. [less than 1 line not declassified] Kasongo promised immediately to send Gizenga a letter requesting him to come to Leopoldville at once and indicated that he, Kasongo, would ask Parliament to lift Gizenga’s parliamentary immunity if he refused to comply.
(Note: Our Chief of Station reported the above to Mac Godley and it was presumably sent by the latter to the Department through his own channel.)
c. In addition to Gizenga’s pressures to obtain key jobs, [name not declassified] said that the Stanleyville representatives were using other [Page 125] methods as well to obtain their objectives and he indicated his belief that they would not stop at terrorist methods, if necessary. In the latter connection, noted that Gizenga has received arms shipments and also stated he had information that Gizenga had shipped gold from Stanleyville to Cairo. Under the circumstances, [name not declassified] asked our Chief of Station to see Adoula shortly in order to advise the latter of the dangers involved in such concessions. [name not declassified] expressed the view that Adoula respected the Chief of Station’s opinion and would be apt to accept his advice and suggested that he might cite examples such as the communist take-over of Czechoslovakia in his talk with him. (Note: Our Chief of Station discussed this immediately with MacGodley, who approved the visit to Adoula. We do not yet have any information that Adoula has been seen.)
d. [name not declassified] was also much concerned about the physical safety of GOC leaders and believed that Gizengists were planning a terrorist campaign and might try to “physically eliminate” Kasavubu, Adoula, Bomboko and Mobutu, and possibly others. [name not declassified] said that Mobutu had been asked to select forty-odd hand-picked commandos to serve as bodyguards for these leaders and requested our support in training them. (Note: As we discussed the other evening, we will certainly do something to respond to [name not declassified] request for the training of “secret service” type bodyguards, but we have serious reservations that any formal training program would have any useful result, this based on experience elsewhere with elements probably more ready to receive this type of instruction than the Congolese.)
e. The final point was [name not declassified] request for three and a half million BCF to pay off political debts incurred during the Lovanium conclave. (Note: Policy authority was received for this from Mr. Scott’s office on 24 August.)