90. Editorial Note

In telegram 1638 from Leopoldville to the Central Intelligence Agency, July 11, 1961, the Station stated that its greatest problem had been to convince the moderate, anti-Lumumba leaders supported by CIA of the need to plan and coordinate activities. Partly as a result of its advice, however, this was now being done by an informal coordination and action group composed of Joseph Mobutu, [names not declassified] had asked for U.S. support of the group’s parliamentary effort, which [Page 120] was agreed to upon condition that its members maintain a close working relationship with the Station. The chances of the [text not declassified] forming a government without Gizenga’s participation were thought to be slim; to offset this, the Station constantly emphasized the importance of the [text not declassified] retaining the key ministries. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 7, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops)

In telegram 1676 from Leopoldville to CIA, July 20, the Station reported that Joseph Ileo had refused to resign as Prime Minister in order to permit Adoula to form a new government. Joseph Kasavubu and Mobutu had agreed that Ileo stood little chance of obtaining a majority vote and warned that an Ileo failure might well divide the parliamentarians and cause them to turn to Gizenga. It now appeared there would be a “donnybrook” at the parliamentary session at Lovanium, and no one could predict the outcome with certainty. However, the Station continued to believe that the [text not declassified] had a good chance of gaining control of the key ministries, including the premiership, of a government of national union. (Ibid.)