80. Editorial Note

In telegram 32898 to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville, April 1, 1961, Bronson Tweedy, Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, stated that in view of changing circumstances and the fairly rapid trend of events he believed it was time to review again the whole subject of military and paramilitary aid to moderate anti-Lumumba leaders in the Congo. Many facets of that assistance were still in development or being planned and included the agreement with the Belgians and preliminary talks with other countries. The impetus for those was the apparent Gizenga military advance and the need to shore up the Congolese National Army as soon as possible, but it now appeared that the Gizenga forces posed little threat, and Joseph Mobutu was now conducting at least preliminary negotiations with Victor Lundula. The prospects for a Mobutu–Lundula armed clash were slight. The biggest threat of an armed clash was between the CNA and the United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC). If this assessment was approximately right, Tweedy stated, then a question arose as to whether continued emphasis should be placed on third countries as military or paramilitary advisers. Tweedy requested the Chief of Station’s views on the subject. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 6, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops)

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In telegram 1183 from Leopoldville to CIA, April 14, the Chief of Station responded that he generally concurred with Tweedy but believed that some military or paramilitary advisers would be of continuing use if and when the Congo situation again reached the boiling point. The Station assumed that the Congo situation would remain chaotic for some time. (Ibid.)