53. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo1
Dir 19039 (Out 58858).
1. As result of policy meeting this morning, you authorized as follows:
(A) To advise Congolese we prepared in principle to support financially their efforts to topple Gizenga regime. That we are anxious to avoid as far as possible full-scale fighting and bloodshed and to use troops wherever possible as show of force to produce desired political end.
(B) To inform Belgians of (A) above and that we will continue to deal with Congolese on these matters.
(C) To concert with [less than 1 line not declassified] in their planning along lines (A) above, with particular attention to UN capability and resolve to “freeze” Stanleyville and Orientale, and thus avoid risk major CNA–UN military clash. (Comment: We have in mind SYG apparent serious reaction to recent USUN démarche and Embtel 14492 re UN stopping Ilyushins. If UN purpose firm, about which plenty of room for doubt, we would then hope to see funds used for full-scale subversion [Page 72] effort against a Gizenga who at least not receiving as much logistic and hardware support as he anticipated).
(D) To request [less than 1 line not declassified] to show you detail their arithmetic re [number not declassified] francs so we can be in better position decide what our contribution should be. You should forward recommendations on this soonest.
2. While necessity for limited role with [less than 1 line not declassified] accepted, wish emphasize need for maximum security this regard order minimize risk of public association with them in this enterprise.3
3. State is sending parallel cable via its channels.4
End of message.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 5, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]; Operational Immediate. Drafted and released by Tweedy.↩
- OCR/CB notified of reference cable. [Footnote in the original.] This telegram has not been found.↩
- In telegram 0567 from Leopoldville to CIA, January 2, 1961, the Chief of Station reported that he had advised the Ambassador of the decision in telegram 19039, and had briefed Bomboko and [text not declassified], who accepted the conditions outlined in paragraph one. (Mobutu was still in Luluabourg.) Considering Mobutu’s defeat at Bukavu, the Chief of Station doubted that the Congolese Government would continue its planned moves on Stanleyville until more troops were available. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 6, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops)↩
- See Document 292 in Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume XIV, Africa.↩