Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

517. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, July 9, 1967, 9:03 p.m.

3469. Brussels 148 and 150.²

1. Agree that we do not want acrimonious debate or unfounded allegations by GDRC UNREP during Monday³ session. Hope that you will be able to make this point to Bomboko so that he can get appropriate instructions to Idzumbuir immediately.

2. Suggest that USUN see Idzumbuir soonest and give him briefing on what US doing for GDRC while making point that we do not believe that denunciation GOB called for.

3. Suggest that Brussels discuss problem once more with FonOff and the GOB instruct its rep at New York to get in touch with Idzumbuir to give him briefing on Belgian offer. If we can judge from past experience, Idzumbir will probably not know of offer nor have knowledge that Bomboko has thanked GOB for offer. Briefing might deflect him a bit.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 THE CONGO. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Brown, cleared by Gleysteen in IO and Moffat, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Brussels, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE.
2. Telegram 148 from Brussels, July 9, is ibid. In telegram 150 from Brussels, July 9, Knight expressed his concern that the Congo, having turned down the Belgian offer of assistance, might press its complaint against Belgium in the Security Council. He pointed out that the mutiny in the Congo had been instigated by mercenaries recruited largely by Mobutu. If the Belgian Representative were to bring this out in the debate, however, Mobutu would be infuriated, which could have grave repercussions on the situation in the Congo. Therefore, Knight suggested that McBride try to get Bomboko to avoid acrimonious charges and counter-charges when the Council met again on July 10. (Ibid.)
3. July 10.
4. On July 10, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 239 (1967), which condemned any state that permitted or tolerated the recruitment of mercenaries, and the provision of facilities to them, with the objective of overthrowing the governments of U.N. member states. It also called upon governments to ensure that their territory was not used for the recruitment, training, and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Congolese Government. (U.N. Doc. S/RES/239) For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, p. 250.