46. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

0390 (In 49486).

1. QJWIN2 arrived Leop 21 Nov. View delicate nature op, Station did not surface him to [Mobutu]. Unilaterally and on own initiative he made contact with Iden 3 who agreed 26 Nov in following plan against target: Iden to supply four UNO vehicles and six Congolese soldiers with UNO brassards and berets. QJWIN posing as [less than 1 line not declassified] officer would enter target’s home and provide escort out of residence. Iden said could easily provide vehicles and men. (UNO announced fifty-five of its vehicles have been stolen and Station knows where [less than 1 line not declassified] uniform available.) Iden organization needed to pierce both Congolese and UNO guards.

2. QJWIN has displayed great initiative, imagination and courage since arrival. Has identified self to Identity as German.

3. View change in location target, QJWIN anxious go Stanleyville and expressed desire execute plan by himself without using any apparat.4 Would go Stan under his own passport and use business credentials from various German firms and chambers of commerce. When employed QJWIN told he would be paid [dollar amount not declassified] [Page 62] per month for period one or maximum two months. If HQS concurs he go Stan. Recommend maintain his salary at same rate.5

End of message.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79–00149A, DDO/IMS Files, Box 23, Folder 1, African Division, Senate Select Committee, Volume II. Secret; Rybat; [text not declassified]PROP; Priority. Eyes only Tweedy or Fields from COS. Received at 2233Z.
  2. QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background recruited in Europe. (Interim Report, p. 43) [text not declassified]. For information about QJWIN’s stay in the Congo from November 21, 1960, until late December 1960, see ibid., pp. 43–46.
  3. Not further identified.
  4. This sentence is quoted in Interim Report, p. 44.
  5. In CIA telegram 14254 to Leopoldville, November 30, Tweedy concurred that QJWIN should go to Stanleyville. He noted that CIA was prepared to consider direct action by QJWIN, but wanted the Chief of Station’s reading on security factors, i.e., how close would this place the United States to the action if he were apprehended. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79–00149A, DDO/IMS Files, Box 23, Folder 1, African Division, Senate Select Committee, Volume II; Interim Report, p. 44) Interim Report noted that this language “could have been interpreted as an assassination order,” but concluded that “there is no clear evidence that QJ/WIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt.” (pp. 44–45) In June 1975, a CIA senior case officer, called Michael Mulroney in Interim Report, testified before the Church Committee that following his own arrival in Leopoldville on November 3, he arranged for QJWIN to come to the Congo to work with him on counter-espionage. Mulroney declared, however, that neither he nor QJWIN was responsible for Lumumba’s departure from UN custody or his subsequent capture. He also testified that so far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and that it was “highly unlikely” that QJWIN was ever used by another agent for an assassination operation. (Ibid., pp. 37–44) See Documents 30 and 45 for further information on Mulroney’s testimony.