Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

457. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo¹

Washington, November 26, 1965, 2023Z.

Dir 60858. Ref: Para 5 Leop 2527 (In 01864) et al.²

1. Wish commend [COS] and Station for outstanding coverage and handling current situation.

2. Understand ODACID has approved [Godley] discreet unofficial contact with [Mobutu] but that they prefer avoid too hasty recognition. Initial informal KUBARK reaction is to support [Mobutu] to utmost. At same time do not wish prejudice [Mobutu] govt chances of success by too open PBPRIME involvement. Must recognize radical Africans, [cryptonym not declassified], and certain Belgian advisors will be out to assure [Mobutu] failure. Thus must proceed carefully in what presently appears welcome development and favorable atmosphere.

3. Specifically, consider that added funds for [Mobutu] more applicable now than ever and hope we’ll have approval 26 Nov.³ However, in anticipation of any possible desire have [Godley] views prior final decision, would be helpful have [Godley] recommendation to support position.⁴ FYI: KUBARK has proposed to [303 Committee] with ODACID concurrence adding [dollar amount not declassified] to previously approved [dollar amount not declassified] contingency fund.

4. Advise [Identity 1] reaction and likely role new govt.⁵

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Vol. III, Mobutu. Secret; Priority. Drafted and authenticated by [name not declassified], coordinated with Waller (AC/AF), and released by [name not declassified].
2. See Document 454; paragraph 5 is not printed.
3. See Document 450.
4. Telegram 2561 from Leopoldville to CIA, November 26, reported that the Chief of Station had discussed this with Godley, who heartily concurred in the advisability of adding [dollar amount not declassified] to the previously approved [dollar amount not declassified] contingency fund. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Vol. III, Mobutu)
5. Telegram 2559 from Leopoldville to CIA, November 26, reported that the Chief of Station had [text not declassified] impression that the coup had caught Nendaka by surprise, but he had rallied in support of Mobutu, [text not declassified] seemed delighted by the fact that the coup apparently was succeeding. The Chief of Station also reported that Mobutu had asked him whether he thought Nendaka should be maintained in his current position, and that he had suggested that he see if the Congolese army would support this. (Ibid., [text not declassified], Vol. IV, [text not declassified])