Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

451. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo¹

Washington, November 23, 1965, 2330Z.

Dir 60320. Ref: Dir 60319 1. View [name not declassified] increasingly intemperate and ill-advised actions in current political crisis plus growing hard evidence that he and his group heading into dangerous waters in their involvement with Communist dominated radical Africans, we wonder whether time has not come for [COS] to have a tough talk with [name not declassified].²

2. [COS] line might be that while political conflict in Congo was between two moderate political factions ODYOKE viewed it as internal affair and thus felt it improper to take sides in the natural and legal interplay of political forces. Now appears as a result largely of [name not declassified] own initiatives with the left that conflict is moving away from internal politics and approaching a confrontation between east and west. When such a situation develops [name not declassified] can easily understand that ODYOKE must take sides. Thus at that point, despite the long and mutually profitable association which we have had with [name not declassified] and his colleagues, ODYOKE would be forced to take all-out action against former friends and throw full effective support on the opposing side.

3. [COS] could explain to [name not declassified] that his recent actions are extremely dangerous but that there is still time for him to pull back and salvage the situation. If he does not he is lost both ways, since even if his group wins it will do so only with Communist backing and [name not declassified] should know full well where that will lead. If the opposing faction wins [name not declassified] and his group will have irrevocably lost the support of their former ODYOKE friends and natural allies.

4. Above or some version thereof could be presented by [COS] as the friendly advice of an old collaborator but would have to be a firm and unequivocal statement. Would clearly need [Godley] concurrence particularly as to timing. Have only informal agreement in principle from ODACID bureau. Appreciate [cryptonym not declassified] and [cryptonym not declassified] views.³

End of message.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Vol. IV, [text not declassified]. Secret; [cryptonym not declassified]. Drafted by [name not declassified], authenticated by [text not declassified], and released by C/AF.
2. In telegram 2483 to CIA, November 23, Leopoldville reported that the Chief of Station met with [name not declassified] that morning and told him he was alienating the U.S. and other foreign governments, which until recently had regarded him as a moderate and constructive Congolese leader. The Chief of Station brought up the allegation that Nendaka had received 2.5 million BCF when he visited Brazzaville on November 4, [text not declassified], although [text not declassified] Anany might have accepted funds. The Chief of Station pointed out that Kasvuubu would need tremendous funds for his reelection campaign and that such funds would only be forthcoming from the Soviets or Chinese Communists if Kasavubu agreed to take the Congo into the radical African camp. [name not declassified] agreed and asked for the Chief of Station’s personal advice. The latter said that he doubted Kasavubu could win reelection [text not declassified]. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 977 from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, November 24, Godley reported that he met with Nendaka that afternoon and told him he was deeply concerned at recent developments in the Congo and that the inflammatory and venomous remarks he and his friends had been making in the press and on the radio had made the Ambassador disappointed in his judgment and wisdom. If the present diatribes continued, blood would undoubtedly flow and the losers would be moderates such as himself. Nendaka agreed that he had gone too far and said he had already ordered the national radio to tone down its comments. He also swore that he would do everything possible to bring about rapprochement, but blamed Kasavubu for his lack of leadership. (Ibid.)