44. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

0320 (In 43551). Re Deptel 1372.2

1. Ambassador concerned by query para 5 ref re progress on plan approved Deptel 1274 (Deptel)3 which approved plan outlined Leop 0162 (in 31811).4 He does not wish (and rightly so) discuss action part this plan via ODACID channels and requests HQS advise ODACID that all communications this subject will be handled via KUBARK channels with HQS passing all information re developments to ODACID.

2. Ref refers to possibility formation interim govt. Embassy and Station wish emphasize plan outlined Leop 0162 did not call for another interim govt. If we tried institute another interim govt effort would be counter productive, annoying parliament, commissioners and certain political leaders. Plan as seen by Embassy and Station is directed toward formation permanent govt. View arrival good offices commission and lack organization Congolese, doubt can implement plan before late December, if then. Thus, Station continuing effort work through [Mobutu] to get firm nose count and signed petition parliamentarians guaranteeing support of new govt. Once this achieved, will enter phase of buying or otherwise attempting swing necessary votes to obtain majority for [cryptonym not declassified]5 forces. Only then will we urge [Mobutu] to open parliament.6

End of message.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 5, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]; Priority. Received at 2017Z.
  2. For Department of State telegram 1372 to Leopoldville, November 12, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume XIV, Africa, Document 262.
  3. See footnote 5 to Document 262, ibid.
  4. See Document 35.
  5. CIA political action program in support of moderate, anti-Lumumba leaders in the Congo.
  6. In CIA telegram 12365 to Leopoldville, November 19, Tweedy informed the Station that he had advised Penfield that quick progress on the operation originally envisaged had undoubtedly been slowed down by local events. He urged the Station to advise CIA immediately whenever it believed the original objectives were either unattainable or had to be reached by radically different means in light of the developing local situation. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 5, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops)