Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

438. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, October 20, 1965, 8:19 p.m.

445. Reur 730, rptd 357 to Brussels;² and 725, info to Brussels 353.³ Dept concurs general line you propose take with Kimba as reported your 725, rptd Brussels 353. Following represents items we consider most important this time but their inclusion does not imply you should omit subjects raised in your 725.

Dept believes you should begin your relationship with Kimba by citing past US efforts support and bolster legally constituted Congolese Governments regardless of personalities directing them. We sincerely hope governmental change will not entail alterations GDRC policies toward US. While we will continue pursue policy nonintervention in internal matters, we hope period ahead will not see settling old accounts among political antagonists, thus providing basis subsequent disorders. In this regard, we can only applaud Tshombe’s reported pledge of support to Kimba (AFP today) based on principle of respect for majority and willingness place Congolese interests above personal or party considerations.

You may wish to remind Kimba of gigantic tasks remaining both in establishing internal security and speeding rehabilitation of formerly rebel-held areas and on economic side in redressing budgetary disequilibrium and balance of payments difficulties. We believe you should refer to advisability that GDRC call upon IMF for further counseling in governmental fiscal efficiency and that, if IMF responds favorably, he create receptive climate in GDRC calculated assure expert suggestions re fiscal discipline be implemented fullest extent. Future of GDRC may well depend on re-establishing equilibrium and solvency Congolese finances.

You may assure Kimba our willingness continue economic aid only in context serious financial program and firm assurances by GDRC take needed measures stabilize economy.

With regard to discussion of GDRC’s external policies, it would seem advisable not to pinpoint Nendaka or other officials purportedly dealing with Ghana, who might misuse or misinterpret such admonishments if passed on by Kimba.

At your discretion you may wish to emphasize importance we attach to GDRC efforts to effect good working relationships with GOB and Belgian authorities in Congo, without however referring specifically to contentious items presently causing strain.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 THE CONGO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Canup in AF/CWG; cleared by Cashin in AID, Moffat in WE, and Brown in AFC; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Brussels.
2. In telegram 730 from Leopoldville, October 20, Godley reported that Kimba asked him to call on October 21. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 725 from Leopoldville, October 20, Godley stated that he did not see any point in discussing with Kasavubu whether it was he or Tshombe who had broken faith. He thought the primary U.S.-Belgian objective should be to get along with the new government and hoped De Kerchove’s instructions would be softened. He thought a tough or defiant Belgian stance was not likely to produce the results both countries were hoping for: a more settled situation and military and economic progress. (Ibid., POL BEL–THE CONGO)