Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

434. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Leopoldville, October 12, 1965.

1560 (In 71225). Refs: A. Leop 0409 (In 27047);² B. Leop 1522 (In 69742);³ C. Leop 1523 (In 69741);⁴ D. Leop 1553 (In 70982);⁵ E. Leop 1554 (In 71090).⁶

1. Current political impasse is result, to considerable extent, of ODYOKE failure to play active role in endeavoring mold political events. Per ref A it was predictable that [cryptonym not declassified] would go all out to remove [Identity 1] from office in absence of some guarantee of support by a major power. Leop continues believe that it would have been possible to guide them and to avoid present situation whereby there is odds on chance [Identity 2] will remove [Identity 1] from office.

2. Leop’s reasoning as follows:

A. [cryptonym not declassified] and many of their allies suspect [Identity 2] is seeking absolute political power. They also believe that if he achieves this objective he will remove them from office and possibly physically liquidate them. Thus they are determined to build a counter force.

B. Counter forces originally intended to limit [Identity 1] powers and to ensure [cryptonym not declassified] should be able play active role in any future govt.

C. Although Leop warned [cryptonym not declassified] on many occasions that ODYOKE was not prepared to fund their activities, they continued to doubt this statement. They were convinced that after nearly five years of close collaboration ODYOKE would not let them go down the drain and would have need of them thus they gathered sufficient funds to create a counterblock, assuming that once the bloc in existence, ODYOKE would recognize its value and pick up the check.

D. When ODYOKE continued maintain hands-off position, [cryptonym not declassified] panicked and concluded they would be unable to hold front Democratique Congolais (FDC) together over prolonged period. They assumed, probably correctly, that [Identity 1] would bribe away sufficient votes to obtain an absolute majority in both houses of parliament. Thus Leop believes [cryptonym not declassified], minus [Mobutu] decided they must either act immediately to remove [Identity 1] from office or risk losing the battle. [Mobutu] who remained confident that he could control [Identity 1] and if necessary use [name not declassified] to prevent his accession to [Identity 2] office, thus differed in tactics from other [cryptonym not declassified].

3. On basis above, Leop believes that had KUBARK mounted political action ops, it would have been relatively easy to control the general lines of [cryptonym not declassified] action. Also believe that our failure to act has inadvertently contributed to encouraging [cryptonym not declassified] to try to oust [Identity 1]. Similarly, we have limited our control of future events, should [cryptonym not declassified] gain control of govt or merely increase their strength within the govt, for they will not feel beholden to us for their victory.

4. View above, as well as fact [cryptonym not declassified] may soon be playing even more active role within govt, Leop continues believe it would be advisable implement political action program. The program should have two phases:

A. As first step would increase regular payments to [cryptonym not declassified], [Identity 3], [Mobutu], [Identity 4]. B. Second and concurrent phase would arrange for funding FDC via [Mobutu], thus strengthening his position with [Identity 4] and [Identity 3] on one hand and [Identity 2] on the other. Also would implement phase only if [Identity 2] were to indicate his concurrence. Do not believe such related action would influence [Identity 2] decision concerning whether or not retain [Identity 1]. However, on off-chance [Identity 1] is maintained, we could better guarantee cooperation between Conaco and FDC. Should [Identity 1] be ousted assume we would wish try control and moderate actions of new govt.

5. Have discussed above points with [Godley]. However he continues believe, per ref D, it would be inadvisable mount such operations. Difference between his view and those of Station may be explained by difference our estimate of [Identity 4] and [Identity 3] basis previous experience, [COS] believes they can be influenced and controlled insofar as major decisions are concerned. [Godley] on other hand distrusts them and doubts Leop ability exert control factor.

6. Recognize general outcome this problem probably will be determined by [Godley]. However submitting these views for HQS info, as continue believe failure play active role can only contribute to further deterioration ODYOKE position.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Fiche 49, Row 2, Frames 11–12, [text not declassified]. Secret; [2 cryptonyms not declassified]; Immediate. Received at 1435Z.
2. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. Dated October 10. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job [text not declassified], Fiche 49, Row 2, Frame 2, [text not declassified])
5. Dated October 12. (Ibid., [text not declassified], Vol. II, Mobutu)
6. Telegram 1554 from Leopoldville to CIA, October 12, reported that the current political picture in Leopoldville remained extremely murky. On October 11, when Devlin urged Mobutu to work with Kasavubu to maintain the tandem, Mobutu responded that in his opinion it was too late to achieve this objective and said Kasavubu had already decided to remove Tshombe and appoint another person. (Ibid., [text not declassified], Fiche 49, Row 2, Frames 6–10, [text not declassified])