417. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo1
1. Imbalance between ODYOKE relations with [cryptonym not declassified] as opposed to [Identity 1] group is matter of growing concern here. While we should presume [cryptonym not declassified] know political and psychological forces at work in Congo better than we, difficult escape conclusion that regardless of [Identity 1] true intentions toward [Identity 2], [cryptonym not declassified] in fact have taken offensive rather than alleged defensive position vis-à-vis [Identity 1] and that they underestimating the consequences of eliminating him.4 Wonder if they not wishfully and unrealistically comparing [Identity 1] situation today to that of [Identity 3] of year ago, when [cryptonym not declassified] were discredited in own country, rebellion out of control, and they dramatically saved skins with recall [Identity 1]. Today [Identity 1] has largely stolen [cryptonym not declassified] thunder, has “heroic image,” fair bit of popularity at home, credit for having put down rebellion, and (in Leop at least) credit for improving supply consumer goods for masses. In view of this, cannot help but think they laboring under an obsession rather than objective analysis.
2. Above leads us to fact that ODYOKE relations with [Identity 1] far from cordial (did our contribution go unnoticed?) and in urgent [Page 605] need overhaul. If appears personal intel relationship between Station and [Identity 1] feasible, request [COS] pick earliest appropriate opportunity discuss with [Godley]. Suggest this also good time review entire [cryptonym not declassified] program and, in view [Godley] statement about [Mobutu] in ref B, [cryptonym not declassified] project as well.
3. Queried [cryptonym not declassified] today re promised letter to [Godley] citing need for [COS] to be presented early to [Identity 1] to allay latter’s suspicion. [cryptonym not declassified] advises he wrote letter and had a recent note from [Godley] stating that he had mentioned to [Identity 1] [COS] impending arrival. [Identity 1] apparently observed that he had heard of [COS’s] assignment. In view current situation believe particularly important [Godley] to either present [COS] or agree to [COS] call on [Identity 1] without undue delay.
End of message.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 11, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; [2 cryptonyms not declassified]. Drafted by [name not declassified], authenticated by [text not declassified], and released by Fields (C/AF).↩
- In telegram 9903 from Leopoldville to CIA, July 7, the Station reported that it was working closely with Godley in an effort to prevent the political pot from boiling over, and noted that the basic problem was mutual distrust between the [cryptonym not declassified] and Tshombe and his entourage. Both groups agreed that an open political fight would undermine what little stability remained in the Congo. Each group, however, also appeared convinced that the other was out to get them. (Ibid.)↩
- Not printed.↩
- CIA telegram 13571 to Leopoldville, May 24, authorized the Station to respond to [text not declassified] recent requests for additional funding by assuring him that CIA supported him solidly as a [text not declassified] figure in future Congolese politics, and by offering him a funding program to help defray election costs and provide financial support over the next 3 months. It instructed the Station to make it clear, however, that such payments and any other financial support were contingent on [text not declassified] positive actions to encourage and reinforce a close relationship between Tshombe and Kasavubu and that any indications to the contrary would result in immediate suspension of payments. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 11, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)↩