33. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

0145 (In 28936). Ref: A. Dir 04802 (Out 78336).2 B. Dir 06250 (Out 81396).3

1. [name not declassified] has not been able penetrate entourage. Thus he has not been able provide ops intel needed this job.4

2. Believe early assignment senior case officer handle [less than 1 line not declassified]PROP ops excellent idea. Although maintaining priority interest this op, able devote only limited amount time, view multiple ops commitments. Situation will be even more complicated when [name not declassified] goes Eliz 19 October. If case officer available, [COS] would devote as much time as possible to assisting and directing his efforts.5

3. Seriously doubt possibility assault house, view strong guard. Concur op feasible if subject goes out into town but view CNA troops watching house, doubt he will try this in near future. Believe possible to mount commando, per ref B. [1 line not declassified]

4. If case officer sent, recommend has pouch soonest high powered foreign make rifle with telescopic sight and silencer. Hunting good [Page 46] here when lights right. However as hunting rifles now forbidden, would keep rifle in office pending opening of hunting season.6

End of message.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79–00149A, DDO/IMS Files, Box 23, Folder 1, African Division, Senate Select Committee, Volume II. Secret; Rybat; [less than 1 line not declassified]PROP. Eyes only Tweedy from COS. Priority. Received at 2348Z.
  2. See Document 30.
  3. Requested Sta views re possibility use commando type group for abduction (subj). [Footnote in the original.] This telegram is Document 32.
  4. All but the first word in this paragraph (#1) was printed in Interim Report, p. 32.
  5. The first, second, and fourth sentences in this paragraph (#2) were printed ibid.
  6. This paragraph (#4) was printed ibid. On October 9, 1975, Tweedy testified that this paragraph clearly referred to sending to the Congo via diplomatic pouch a weapon suited for assassinating Lumumba. The case officer subsequently sent to the Congo testified that he had no knowledge of any such weapon being pouched to the Congo. Tweedy said that he interpreted the cable to mean that “an operational plan involving a rifle” had not yet been formulated and that the “opening of hunting season” would depend upon approval of such a plan by CIA headquarters. (Ibid.)