167. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
1. On 17 November 1961, Special Group approved a proposal to undertake specific covert actions in the Congo in support of the moderate government headed by Prime Minister Adoula and authorized the expenditure of up to [dollar amount not declassified] for this purpose. On April 23, 1963, a progress report was submitted to Special Group which approved the continuation of these covert actions which were programmed for [dollar amount not declassified]. The [cryptonym not declassified] project outline was initially approved for FY 1962 for [dollar amount not declassified], the FY 1963 renewal was approved for [dollar amount not declassified].
2. The policy coordination of this project with the Department of State has been singularly close since its inception. The U.S. Ambassador to the Congo has been kept informed at all times and has frequently added his endorsement to station proposals. Coordination with the Chief of the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State has been most close and no major steps have been taken without thorough [Page 237] and detailed discussions both with the Department of State and with the Ambassador.
3. The policy guidance laid down by the Department of State to strengthen the moderate elements in the Government of the Congo led by Prime Minister Adoula remains the central objective of Project [cryptonym not declassified]. During the first two years of this project the Adoula Government was plagued by a crescendo of political crises which led to a constant recourse to crash ad hoc funding. Because of the immediacy of the crisis of the moment there was never an opportunity to examine a request for support in detail, and the alternative to non-support was the ever present danger that the moderate government would fall, being replaced by extremist nationalists who, without cohesion or program would rapidly reduce the Congo to chaos thereby inviting subversive Communist activities. This approach did succeed in that the Adoula Government has maintained itself in power to some extent through this device of crisis-funding and has survived not only the threat of the Katanga secessionist regime, but several political crises notably in November 1962 and March 1963.
4. Political Program: In an effort to get away from this crash funding and bring some order and organization to the political operations of Prime Minister Adoula and his close colleagues [less than 1 line not declassified] negotiations were begun with them in the Fall of 1963. It was made abundantly clear to the [less than 1 line not declassified] that the U.S. Government was not going to continue the ad hoc funding and would require from them an organized program leading to the formation of a national political party which would act as their political instrument in the anticipated national elections.
5. A detailed budget was hammered out with the [less than 1 line not declassified] (the details of which are given in Attachment B) looking towards the formation of RADECO (Rassemblement Democratique Congolaise). The Ambassador participated in discussions on this budget and urged their favorable consideration. The Chief of the Bureau of Central African Affairs also participated in these discussions. Approval was given by the Department of State and a cable was sent to the field on 8 November 1963 authorizing a budget of [dollar amount not declassified] for these purposes.
6. The station is satisfied that the funds are being expended for political ends in support of the Adoula Government if not in adherence with the budget outline. The station is obtaining accountings on those hard currency expenditures in Europe, but despite all efforts cannot obtain accountings for funds expended locally. Realistically, even if procured, such accountings would be relatively meaningless. One built-in protection, however, is that the passage of funds is always known to at [Page 238] least two of the [less than 1 line not declassified] thereby limiting the potential for personal profit.
7. This agreement has put an end to the ad hoc funding which in itself is an accomplishment, but it has not led to the effective establishment of RADECO. The results to date have been most disheartening despite all efforts to get RADECO going.2 [3½ lines not declassified] The station has done its utmost in daily and weekly guidance but a 90-day review clearly showed that the RADECO organization had barely gotten off the ground. The Chief of Station has been given authority to suspend payments of funds. Although he has not fully exercised this authority yet, by dragging his feet on the last installment, and giving the recipients a rather blunt lecture, has paved the way for a total suspension or a thorough-going revision of the current budget. Headquarters has also made its dissatisfaction bluntly clear to [5 lines not declassified].
8. The dissatisfactions with the organization of RADECO are now well known to all the principals and even the Congolese have admitted its shortcomings. The station is now in a position to examine coldly with the [less than 1 line not declassified] without mincing words, the political problem of their future survival.
9. Military Support: Nominal direct assistance had been authorized by Special Group in April 1963 for General Joseph D. Mobutu, the Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese National Army. General Mobutu has been able to scotch at least one attempted military coup against the government and has remained loyal throughout to the Adoula Government.
10. The Special Group also authorized in April 1963 support to the Congolese National Army in order to retain its loyalty under General Mobutu to the incumbent moderate regime. This authorization was not called upon until March 1964 when the station requested, with the endorsement of the Ambassador, that support should be provided the Congolese National Army at the rate of [dollar amount not declassified] per month at least for the balance of FY 1964, at which time the arrangement would be renegotiated in light of existing circumstances.
11. This support was frankly intended to help maintain this key member of the [less than 1 line not declassified] in his present position at a time when he was under fire by the violent exile opposition operating out of Brazzaville, and through his efforts to ensure the continued loyalty of the Army. The funds would be used largely to improve the [Page 239] amenities of the officers, for amelioration of messes, and possibly small emergency loans to deserving army personnel.
12. This matter was approved after coordination with the Department of State and cabled authorization was given on 5 March 1964 for the station to expend up to [dollar amount not declassified] through June 1964. It was agreed at that time with the DDP/PG/CA that the [cryptonym not declassified] project outline would be amended to cover this additional amount.
[Omitted here is further discussion of the project.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 1, [cryptonym not declassified]—Development & Plans. Secret. The original is attached to a memorandum, dated April 22, 1964, from Glenn Fields, Chief of CIA’s Africa Division in the Directorate of Plans, to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carter. Fields recommended that Carter approve amendment of Project [cryptonym not declassified] for FY 1964 for a revised funding total of [dollar amount not declassified]. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Thomas Karamessines concurred in the recommendation. Lyman Kirkpatrick, acting for Carter, approved the recommendation on June 1. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 0097 from Leopoldville to CIA, February 21, the station reported on its efforts to get the [cryptonym not declassified] “to come up with some sort of businesslike statement of progress” and stated that RADECO seemed to have made little progress organizationally. (Ibid.)↩