138. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

PROJECT RENEWAL—[cryptonym not declassified]

A. Current Objectives

The central objective of this project continues to be the strengthening of the present moderate elements of the Government of the Congo (GOC) in order to permit the GOC a sufficiently strong footing to achieve and maintain unity of the entire Congo, and to ensure that a moderate pro-West, or at least genuinely neutral, government remains in power. The Adoula Government is still in power and the current [Page 194] prognosis for re-integration of Katanga is as optimistic as it has ever been. CIA’s activities in support of this objective have played a vital role in the current degree of accomplishment; it is in fact doubtful that the objective could have been attained without CIA activities closely coordinated with overall U.S. Government policy and planning.

[Omitted here are operational and personnel aspects of the project.]

C. Intelligence Production

Approximately 200 field intelligence reports were received during 1962, a very large percentage of which were disseminated. Much of the information was semi-overt or highly perishable. Undoubtedly some of this information was slanted since the [cryptonym not declassified] clearly knew they were talking to U.S. officials and it is doubtful that they always made a clear distinction between Department of State and CIA officers. Nevertheless, on many occasions valuable information was received in time for the U.S. Government to consider it and act upon it before the GOC itself took certain steps. In addition, it is highly probable that because of the special relationship with the [less than 1 line not declassified] developed by Chief of Station, Leopoldville, information was obtained which could not have been obtained by Embassy officers.

CIA was also able to obtain much valuable information not disseminated which has been useful for operational planning, for background purposes, and for counter-intelligence purposes.

D. Effectiveness

(1) Financial support to an unofficial grouping known as the Customary Tribal Chiefs, while it has not as yet led to the forming of a cohesive national political party, has served to bring Premier Adoula a certain degree of political support.

(2) A [less than 1 line not declassified] international public relations program has enabled the Adoula Government to project an international image, primarily among Afro-Asian countries, which the government could not have achieved if left to its own resources. The Adoula Government continues to receive general support from those countries which were the principal targets of this activity and this has been of great value in the United Nations. [3 lines not declassified]

(3) The Adoula Government has not yet been able to gain complete control of an effective, large-circulation newspaper. However, [less than 1 line not declassified] financial support as well as guidance as to content has played a significant role in maintaining both the existence and the effectiveness of a new newspaper which is generally recognized to be a government outlet.

(4) [less than 1 line not declassified] support has enabled a major labor union to increase its effectiveness in Congolese labor matters. [Page 195] This union has supported the Adoula Government policies, or has been constructively critical.

(5) Financial support to General Mobutu, Chief-of-Staff of the Congolese National Army, has been effective in enabling him to retain the loyalty of key officers. At one time Mobutu was able to restrain his officers from action which could possibly have negated U.S. efforts.

(6) [1 line not declassified] the development of a cooperative in Equateur province has generated an interest in cooperative activity as a whole and has put a specific cooperative on its economic feet. One of Adoula’s principal political supporters has profited from a certain amount of grassroots political support through association with this activity.

(7) The provision by CIA of non-Congolese pilots to the pilotless Congolese Air Force resulted in an increase of local prestige to the Adoula Government at a critical time.

(8) On numerous occasions financial support as well as political guidance to Adoula and his principal supporters have enabled them to survive immediate, short-term crises, failure in which might have resulted in the downfall of the government, or to accomplish certain tactical objectives which enhanced their overall political posture.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the personnel aspects of the project.]

G. Interagency Coordination

Coordination with the Department of State, both in the field and at Headquarters, has been continually close and detailed.

H. Plans

Plans will to a great extent be conditioned by the outcome of the Katanga secession and the ability of the Adoula Government to focus its attention effectively upon internal problems, particularly economic ones. Reasonable achievements in this area should do much to ensure continued political support by the population. Nevertheless, the future stability of the Adoula Government is by no means ensured even with the successful reintegration of Katanga. A slight de-emphasis on public relations in the international arena is possible. The formation of a political organization able to concentrate close local and provincial political support for the Adoula Government is necessary. Increased internal propaganda support is envisioned, and candidates for newspaper and radio jobs are currently being interviewed and assessed.

Special Group authority has been granted for a para-military project which aims to provide a stop-gap internal security and counter-insurgency striking force during the interim between the phase-out of [Page 196] UN troops and the long-range training of regular Congolese National Army troops.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the personnel aspects of the project.]

As another stop-gap pressure to strengthen internal security, pending results from implementation of the Greene Plan, it is planned to continue and expand support to the Congo Air Force. Provision of qualified pilots, together with a limited maintenance capability, has already converted a previously “paper” Air Force into an airborne one, and the planned expansion will give this new Air Force a nationwide operational capability.

[Omitted here is detailed discussion of the costs of the project.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 1, [cryptonym not declassified]—Development & Plans. Secret. The original is attached to a Project Action form from the CIA’s Congo desk to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carter requesting [text not declassified] for the [text not declassified] project for FY 1963. On March 18, Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick signed for the Deputy Director as Approving Authority.