Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

135. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Leopoldville, March 1, 1963.

6155 (In 77386). Ref Dir 20038.²

1. Leop and [name not declassified] have discussed full spectrum [cryptonym not declassified] programs. Following concensus:

2. [cryptonym not declassified] do not constitute team but group leaders whose interests more or less coincide, whose fates more or less interdependent and who have in past tended work in close concert principally in times immediate crisis. [Identity 1] failure use them as team has reduced cohesion of group. [Identity 1] seems least integral member group but at same time most critical member. Of late, has tended decreasingly take others into confidence and appears increasingly susceptible to undesirable advice (which subj separate cable).³

3. Per [less than 1 line not declassified],⁴ general outlines action plan given [Identity 1] late Jan which while well recd has stimulated no action his part. Ditto others in group who assert they anxious implement but cannot do so without [Identity 1] support and leadership. Neither group as such nor individual members capable fleshing out this plan in terms timetable, budget, etc, so this must be done by Leop. Even when fully prepared, plan with details will probably bear only vague resemblance to actions taken, timing and actual expenditures due in part need adapt actions to developing situations and in part to inability Congolese stick to predetermined course.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the plan.]

5. If all preliminary conditions met, believe implementation stands chance initial success of no more than one third total districts Congo. Excluded might be Kongo Central which currently virtually at war with central govt and parts Kivu, Katanga, Kasai and possibly Orientale. Hence in near future wildest success would build [cryptonym not declassified] party with large block of votes but which might well fall short of absolute majority. However believe well organized homogeneous group, if such can be formed, will attract numerous other political leaders, as bandwagon movement even stronger in Congo than elsewhere. In summation would not foresee immediate across-board success of [cryptonym not declassified] National Party but if early success considerable believe it would then gather steam and achieve desired results.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the plan.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 1, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]; Routine. Received at 1953Z.
2. Hqs. wished take advantage [text not declassified] TDY Leop for detailed discussion [text not declassified] Program. [Footnote in the original.] CIA telegram 20038 to Leopoldville, February 23, stated that the Agency wished to take advantage of [text not declassified] temporary duty in Leopoldville for a detailed discussion of the [text not declassified] program. It recognized the limitations inherent in getting the [text not declassified] to plan, but would appreciate the Station’s efforts to delineate programs and attempt insofar as circumstances permitted to establish organized bases which could be used in determining the extent to which the CIA should support the tribal chiefs’ organization, a new political party, and other [text not declassified] political action programs. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. Document 134.