112. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

3632 (In 19993). Ref Leop 3594 (In 17216).2

1. Per ref and [Gullion] instructions [COS] met with [Identity 1], [Mobutu], and [Identity 2] on 9, 10 and 11 April. Had several meetings [Page 152] with first two. Although none of above specifically admitted in so many words, first two made it clear [Identity 3] intentionally ducking [COS]. In reply queries why this the case, [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] insisted ODYOKE policy too closely tied to that of UN. They said [Identity 3] was strong supporter of UN until recently but has now turned against UN because of its failure insist GOC find workable solution to Katanga problem.

2. Gist of [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] remarks as follows:

A. GOC convinced Tshombe will never agree to Katanga reintegration unless military pressure used. GOC has reached conclusion UNOC will not employ military pressures on Katanga.

B. GOC dissatisfied with what it considers ineffective UNOC efforts solve Congo economic problems. GOC leaders believe great percentage UNOC Congo expenditures devoted to salaries, housing and other UNOC overhead costs which do not directly assist Congo economic situation. [Mobutu] commented 84 of every 100 dollars expended by UNOC goes for such overhead expenditures.)

C. GOC leaders distrust UNOC leaders. Distrust based on historical background UNOC such as Dayal’s opposition Mobutu regime, Khiari’s efforts bring about ouster [Identity 4] and [Mobutu] and other [cryptonym not declassified]. [Mobutu] commented “How can you expect us to trust men who have repeatedly tried to destroy us.”

D. [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] opined ODYOKE policy would fail so long as it closely allied to UNOC. Thus they urged policy whereby ODYOKE would act outside UN channels to assist GOC in its struggle with Katanga and its efforts restore Congo economy.

E. [Identity 1] said most GOC leaders believe UNOC had Tshombe on ropes during December fighting and blames ODYOKE for stopping fighting in order hold Kitona meetings. He added most GOC leaders interpret this as indication ODYOKE indirectly supporting Tshombe. This respect he recited charges that GOK building up its military strength while current talks continue.

3. [COS] explained ODYOKE policy has always supported GOC and sought bring about Katanga reintegration. Reminded [Mobutu] and [Identity 1] of considerable economic, moral and covert support provided by ODYOKE since Sept 60. They acknowledged this fact but reiterated view ODYOKE all-out support UNOC will in long run result in failure ODYOKE policy and GOC efforts reintegrate Katanga. When [COS] pointed out [Identity 5] and [Identity 3] had often expressed wish all ODYOKE aid be through UNOC channels, interlocutors reminded him these statements made prior [Identity 3] disillusionment with UNOC. [Identity 1] added that, since GOC foreign policy line is one of non-alignment, [Identity 3] would probably continue express many official conversation view that ODYOKE aid should continue be [Page 153] via UNOC channels. However [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] expressed firm opinion [Identity 3] would welcome bilateral ODYOKE aid.

4. [COS] chided [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] re childishness of [Identity 3] avoiding only man who might be able provide sufficient aid for Congo. Reminded them insult to [Gullion] was indirectly insult to ODYOKE and thus could lead to serious consequences. All agreed and indicated they would call facts to [Identity 3] attention. Per Embtel 25713 [Identity 3] called and met with [Gullion] night 11 April. By 12 April [Mobutu] stated call made as result [Identity 1] intervention.

5. Leop regards [Identity 3] action in avoiding [Gullion] as indication former’s utter frustration as result failure resolve Katanga problem and other governmental pressures. Basis [Gullion’s] comments and comments [two cryptonyms not declassified] and [Mobutu] it appears [Identity 3] so overwhelmed by current problems he on verge crack-up. Also as result these pressures appears he seeking almost any solution and in process abandoning many old friends and seeking new ones. (Preparing separate cable re [Identity 3] expressions lack confidence [Identity 4] and [Mobutu] and [Identity 2].) In short fear [Identity 3] rapidly becoming desperate man who willing risk almost anything including turning against old friends in hope of finding solutions which he has not found by working with current political allies. (This respect see Leop 33604 for earlier report re [Identity 3] frustrations and his determination achieve Katanga settlement at almost any cost.)

6. In addition to his frustrations which result in his blaming ODYOKE, among others, for his present dilemma, [Identity 3] may also be influenced by lack of personal friendship for [Gullion]. Have received following indications of his feelings to [Gullion] and ODYOKE:

A. [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] commented [Identity 3] would never have avoided [Gullion’s] predecessor as he has [Gullion]. They explained that [Gullion] lacks warm personality and apparent sincere desire assist GOC that they found in his predecessor.

B. [cryptonym not declassified] told [COS] that Israeli rep at UN showed him dispatch from Israeli Chargé Leo in which latter quoted [Identity 3] as saying he tired [Gullion] playing role of “patron.”

C. [name not declassified] told [COS] night 12 April he overheard phone conversation re Congolese efforts obtain dollars to buy military vehicles in which [Identity 3] stated he disgusted with PBPRIMERS (“Les PBPRIMERS m’emmerdent”).

7. [Gullion] has requested [COS] see [Identity 3] ASAP re means whereby ODYOKE hopes support him. Plan use meeting as means attempt [Page 154] determine [Identity 3] present position vis-à-vis ODYOKE and other [cryptonym not declassified] will advise.

8. Above for KUBARK background on Congo situation which may be in early stages of shift away from directions ODYOKE would like to see. Do not wish alarm HQS but Leop now in process trying put various conflicting items information together to outline new situation. In this connection see [cryptonym not declassified] Leop 3564 (In 14923).5

End of message.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 10, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; Routine. Tweedy from COS. Received at 1837Z.
  2. Gullion and [COS] views on what to do to bring [cryptonym not declassified] attention ODYOKE displeasure at not being in contact with GOC leaders (specifically [cryptonym not declassified]). [Footnote in the original.] In telegram 3594 from Leopoldville to CIA, April 10, the Chief of Station reported a conversation with Ambassador Gullion during which the latter expressed anger with Adoula and other Congolese leaders, saying that the strong U.S. interest in the Congo problem had gone to their heads and that he would not put up with such treatment. Gullion suggested that if the situation were not remedied in the near future, he and the Chief of Station should be recalled for consultations, letting it be known prior to their departure that there might be a change in U.S. policy toward the Congolese Government. (Ibid.)
  3. Not found.
  4. Not found.
  5. Reported the arrest of journalists and labor leaders by the GOC. [Footnote in the original.] This CIA telegram has not been found.