54. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1

1990. 1. Important you bring to attention UARG authorities concern with which USG views Nasser’s speech April 23 in Yemen violently attacking UK position in Aden.2 You should point out not only fact that such public statements by UAR President serve exacerbate tense situation already existing between Yemen and Aden but, insofar as they relate to important Western interests, threaten to place strain on UAR-US relations. You should recall that on several occasions in past 18 months USG has made clear to highest UARG levels that USG considers Aden, no less than Saudi Arabia, an important Western interest (see Presidential correspondence; also Cairo tels 655, 671, and 726 Oct-Nov 1962).3 At same time on at least two occasions UARG gave us assurances that it had no intention subvert territory surrounding Yemen (Cairo tels 655, 671) and at other times has acknowledged our interests in Peninsula. While USG favors progress and eventual independence for Aden (SAF), it would deplore any radical action which seeks to force peremptory and premature UK withdrawal from Aden base. This the UARG should clearly understand in following any future course of action re Aden.

2. Also you should note that speech appears to contradict public official UARG statement of December 18, 1962.4 Latter commenced, “UAR confirms and supports the full contents of the communique released by the Government of the YAR”. YARG communique stated inter alia “We hope to live in peace and harmony with our neighbors to the extent that they share our hope”. While UARG might argue that Yemen’s southern neighbor has not manifested desire live at peace with YARG, you should take stand this is not in fact the case. While [Page 129] HMG has failed to recognize YARG, nevertheless we convinced HMG wishes “live at peace” and avoid tensions with YARG as reflected, for example, in HMG desire work out satisfactory pull-back arrangements along Yemen-Aden frontier.5

3. We intend to call in UAR Ambassador early next week and make similar approach.6

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on April 24, cleared by Davies and Judd, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Jidda, Taiz, Aden, London, Dhahran, and USUN.
  2. On a surprise visit to Yemen, Nasser made a speech on April 23 stating that the people in Aden and the neighboring British protectorates were suffering from the “harshest form of tyranny, oppression, and torture at the hands of British colonialism” and vowing to expel Britain from all parts of the Arab world. (The United States in World Affairs 1964; Harper and Row, New York, 1965)
  3. Telegram 655 from Cairo, October 18, 1962, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, pp. 184186. Telegram 671 from Cairo, October 22, 1962 is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961-1963, 786H.02/10-2262) Telegram 726 from Cairo, November 9, 1962 (786H.00/11-962), is Document 289 in the microfiche supplement for Foreign Relations, 1961–1963: Near East; Africa.
  4. See the editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 268269.
  5. In telegram 2660 from Cairo, May 10, Ambassador Badeau reported that he had met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad that day to discuss the Yemen-Aden situation. Badeau said he had emphasized that he was speaking on behalf of the U.S. Government’s independent interest in the tranquility and orderly progress of the Arabian peninsula and Aden area and not on behalf of the British position. The Ambassador said that he had argued that the British presence in the Persian Gulf had been a stabilizing factor and that rapid British withdrawal could only result in chaos, of which the situation in Yemen was a disturbing current example. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN)
  6. Circular telegram 2022 to Cairo, April 29, reported that Jernegan met with Ambassador Kamel on April 27 to discuss prospects for defusing the Aden-Yemen dispute. Jernegan said that Nasser’s call for expulsion of the British from the “Arab South” sounded like political war against a Free World base. Kamel responded that Nasser’s speech did not reflect a calculated campaign to oust the United Kingdom from the Arabian peninsula, but a heated reaction to U.K. non-recognition of Yemen, infiltration, and the Harib attack. Jernegan emphasized the need to take steps to avoid confrontation, such as resumption of efforts to separate SAF and YAR forces and initiation of UK-UAR talks. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN) For Ambassador Hart’s discussion of Yemen with Nasser on May 7, see Document 336.