Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 27, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Countering UAR Pressure against the British Position in Aden

PARTICIPANTS

• British Side
  • R. A. Butler, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
  • The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
  • Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. John Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister
  • Mr. R. S. Crawford, Assistant Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Denis Greenhill, Minister, British Embassy
  • Mr. Patrick Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy
• United States Side
  • The Secretary
  • NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot
  • IO—Mr. Harlan Cleveland
  • EUR—Mr. William Burdett
  • EUR—Mr. Thomas Judd
  • S/S—Mr. Benjamin Read
  • NE—Mr. Rodger Davies

Mr. Butler noted Nasser’s recent attacks in his Yemen speeches against Britain and Israel and said there was no doubt now that he is a major enemy of Great Britain and, he believed, of the United States. He recalled that a previous speech had created problems for the United States and Great Britain in Libya. In addition, he has ambitions against the British in Arabia and is guilty of resuscitating the Israel problem. Clearly he is our enemy. Therefore, we must frame a joint Anglo-American policy to cope with him. The British Cabinet doubts that continuing Western aid to Nasser is in our interests. It also doubts that any attitude of friendliness toward Nasser is appropriate in present circumstances.

Mr. Butler noted that an intelligence paper on subversion had been provided the Department. This paper was well documented. It was quite clear that UAR subversive activities against the South Arabian Federation (SAF) will have to be fought by countersubversive measures.

In Yemen itself, instead of a reduction of UAR military strength as agreed by Nasser, there are now more than 40,000 UAR troops in the country. The position seems to be in stalemate. It is true that the Royalists cannot take the country but they can harass the YAR sufficiently (e.g., by cutting roads) to tie down 40,000 UAR troops. Mr. Butler noted that Hafiz Wahba in London had said there was increasing collusion between the UAR troops and the Royalists in that, hungry for food, the soldiers were trading arms for supplies. Efforts to establish an “intermediate, moderate, government” have failed and it is obvious that we cannot deal with Sallal.

The British Cabinet is determined to maintain the Aden base since it is vital for Britain’s position in the Near East and the Gulf. The British economy is dependent on Gulf oil. If the supply were disrupted, there are alternate sources but not at reasonable rates.² Therefore, the Aden base and the hinterland constitute a vital interest to the British Government which must be preserved at all costs. Nasser’s power to undermine this base must be stopped. A variety of steps can be taken. We should, at the outset, recognize the link of the UAR, the YAR and the USSR. With agreements reached during Sallal’s recent visit to Moscow, the Russians are in a better position to set up a pincer movement based on states they are helping: Yemen, Somalia and the UAR. It was clear that this movement created a situation of utmost delicacy and danger for us.

Mr. Butler said the British would like to concert action with the U.S. in using the United Nations to bring about a demarcation and demilitarization of the Aden frontier and a dispatch of observers to the area. Sir Patrick Dean considered a major move in the United Nations with U.S. support could bring this about. Without U.S. support, little could be done. Ambassador Beeley in Cairo thought a British approach to Nasser was no longer necessary before making a move in the Security Council.

Mr. Butler said that it must be made clear that HMG is not willing to let the YAR get away with what it is doing. The British will not see the Royalists go down. The government intends to see that the Royalists are provided money covertly to supply their needs. This would preferably be channeled through Saudi Arabia.

In summary, the British felt they must take action in the United Nations and mount countersubversive activities against hostile YAR actions.

The Secretary said he would ask Assistant Secretary Talbot to comment on UAR-Saudi Arabian relations, particularly insofar as Saudi Arabia might not be sufficiently resilient to withstand pressures that might arise from reactivation of the Yemen problem. The USG had no illusion about the disengagement agreement insofar as the reduction of UAR troops is concerned but quite clearly it had contributed in large degree to Saudi Arabia’s present stability. We are concerned at Nasser’s activities which are certainly not helpful to our area interests. However, insofar as the threat to Israel is concerned, at this point this is mostly talk. This is a gambit to mobilize Arab opinion, Israel being the only subject on which Arabs can agree. Insofar as Libya is concerned, Nasser’s February 22 speech inflamed the issue, but we think the situation is manageable. There are strong indications that the King and the Prime Minister are seeking a solution. Our ability to restrain Nasser’s propaganda will be helpful in bringing this about. The problem in the area basically comes down to Aden and South Arabia. The Secretary asked Mr. Cleveland to give his estimate of the possibility of gaining Security Council endorsement along the lines proposed.

Mr. Cleveland replied that we might get a general “standdown” on threats. In the last go-around on Yemen, the atmosphere had been inflamed by Britain’s Harib raid, and there was a reluctance on both sides to involve the UAR. On another round, now that the issue of the raid is out of the Security Council’s system, it might be possible to get some kind of machinery on the ground in South Yemen.

The Secretary asked about the problem of delimiting the Federation-Yemen boundary.

Mr. Crawford replied that in the West the border is marked, but that the greater part of it in the East is not. Since 1934, Britain has attempted to gain Yemen’s cooperation in demarcating the Eastern section but Yemen has consistently dragged its feet. The line agreed on in 1934 sets the status quo line in the area and is regarded by Britain as the frontier. Mr. Cleveland noted that Yemenis oppose demilitarization efforts since this connotes acceptance of some frontier line.

Mr. Talbot said that last fall some progress had been made on a drawback agreement. It is worthwhile pressing to see if this affords a possible means for progress now.

In response to the Secretary’s query as to the ability of Aden Federation spokesmen, Mr. Crawford replied that the Minister of External Affairs had made an exceedingly good impression in corridor conversations in the UN. It was difficult for him to speak in open forum, however, because the UK is responsible for the Federation’s foreign relations. Nevertheless, the UK were trying to arrange for him to tour various Arab capitals.

Mr. Talbot said the situation in Saudi Arabia had improved greatly over last year. Faysal’s personal position was better and the position of his Government within the country was stronger. There was a semi-rapprochement with the UAR. Faysal had said he would go to Cairo although since Nasser’s Yemen speeches this may now be less likely. If the Yemen conflict is reactivated and Faysal is reinvolved in support of the Royalists, his position might well be impaired.

Mr. Butler said that he was not suggesting overt British aid to the Royalists. The Saudis themselves had been giving a lot of covert assistance. The Secretary responded that in the Near East, covert activities seem rapidly to become overt.

The Secretary then asked why the British felt Nasser had gone to Yemen. Mr. Butler said he thought with 40,000 troops tied down, he needed to bolster morale. He noted that Ambassador Spinelli had said there was trouble among the troops in Yemen and also among their families in Egypt.

The Secretary said we thought Nasser would have a problem with his troops and that his speeches were designed to bolster morale among them. He asked whether there were any indication that he was contemplating more than just propaganda attacks at this juncture.

Mr. Butler replied that the bulk of UAR troops are still in the north of Yemen. What concerns the British is subversion in the Arabian Federation. Recent indications were that the UAR would increase its subversive activities, and assassination of British officials in Aden has even been mentioned. There are, however, no indicators of contemplated UAR military action against Aden but rather active UAR encouragement in centers of dissidence within the Federation. A new turn has been the introduction of more sophisticated weapons.

In response to Lord Harlech’s question as to what Saudi Arabian reaction would be to the collapse of the disengagement formula, Mr. Talbot said that it had been our presumption that the UAR would move to renew UNYOM’s mandate. In view of Nasser’s recent speeches, Faysal might well not agree to continuation. The Secretary inquired as to Saudi Arabia’s attitude toward Aden and the Federation. Sir Harold Caccia noted Hafiz Wahba had said that Faysal seeks to restore the same relations that his father, Abdul Aziz, had maintained with the British. Faysal saw clearly that his support to Nasser in 1956 had been a serious mistake. He had also said that he saw no prospect of the UAR withdrawing its troops from Yemen or agreeing to a real coalition government. He seems content with the British position in Aden and the Gulf.

In response to the Secretary’s questions as to whether the Royalists had access to seaports and what value money would be to them, Mr. Crawford said the tribes were very venal and money would buy support as well as arms which could be brought over borders.

The Secretary asked Mr. Butler whether he had the actual figures on U.S. aid and thought that the British should know actually what is involved. The USG was concerned over its relations with the UAR: If we start actions which will annoy and antagonize Nasser, we have not helped our situation but have hindered it by closing a channel of communication to him and losing what little influence we have in Cairo.

Mr. Butler said that the question of aid is less essential than that Nasser understand clearly that the U.S. is displeased with his performance.

The Secretary said that, in brief, he understood the British were suggesting that we support British initiative in the UN to bring about disengagement and demilitarization on the Aden-Yemen frontier, and desired our comments on possible British extension of covert aid to the Royalists, and aid to the UAR.

Mr. Butler said the UK would not mind taking the initiative itself in the Security Council although it wanted U.S. support. Sir Patrick Dean thought that the non-permanent members of the Security Council, particularly Brazil, Morocco, and Norway would support any moderate move to improve the situation in Yemen and it was important to gain their support. Mr. Talbot said that insofar as the UNYOM was being financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAR, he assumed that any extension to the South would be financed by the UK.

Mr. Butler thought this would probably be the case. He noted that if he were “in the hands of the extremists in the Cabinet”, the position he expounded would be much more radical. At present, the Cabinet had decided to give aid covertly to the Royalists although some members favored more direct action. He did not wish to put too much emphasis on the question of covert support for the Royalists, but he considered it vital that the U.S. know what is in HMG’s mind. He wished to make clear that what he had presented reflected Sir Alec Home’s view.

The Secretary said that we have told Nasser more than once of our interest in both Saudi Arabia and Aden. If augmented support to the Royalists generates pressure against Saudi Arabia, a major problem would be created for us since Saudi Arabia is not the best place to confront Arab nationalism. Quite clearly, the British suggestions would have to be discussed with the President; he would also raise the question of aid to the UAR. He inquired whether the British were in contact with Nasser. Mr. Butler replied that Ambassador Beeley had planned a meeting with Nasser, but had suggested, after Nasser’s latest speech, that an approach through the Security Council would be more effective. If the USG were interested, however, HMG would consider an approach in Cairo first. For the record, Mr. Butler wanted to note that the British have in mind improvement schemes for the Federation initially involving around three million pounds. Similarly, it is ready to examine the question of independence. He wanted to make clear also that the British would have to take military action to put down insurrection within the Federation. The first instance was likely to be action against the Dhala tribe. The Secretary asked whether Adenese constituted the bulk of the Federal Army and police and, if so, whether they were loyal. Mr. Crawford replied that they were, in principle. However, if worked upon they would be unreliable. The allegiance of tribal leaders was important, but all tribes were venal.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Davies. The text was coordinated with Patrick Wright of the British Embassy.
2. For documents relating to U.S. international oil policy, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 175 ff.