Office of the Historian

53. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball1

RSB-40
Washington, April 13, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Indications of Soviet-Arab Pressures Against Aden

The way in which the Soviet Union has been handling three events—the Cyprus crisis, Yemeni President Sallal’s visit to the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev’s scheduled visit in May to the UAR—provides evidence of renewed initiatives by Moscow in the Arab world. This paper assesses the pattern, probable direction, and scope of the Soviet moves.

Abstract

The British position in the Near and Middle East, specifically the base at Aden and the South Arabian Federation, appears to have become the principal target of Soviet policy in the region. Moscow has followed two paths to this end. The first has been direct, consisting of increased propaganda against British interests and based in “unliberated” areas of the Arab world, support of Arab charges of British “aggression” against the Yemeni Arab Republic, consolidation of direct influence in Yemen as a result of YAR President Sallal’s visit to Moscow, and the use of the Cyprus crisis to undercut the British position in the area. The second has been indirect, designed, by removing distractions, to concentrate Arab attention on the British. The Soviets have advised the Arabs against violence towards Israel and have muted previous stimulation of inter-Arab rivalries between “progressive” and “reactionary” regimes.

Apparently, Moscow believes that the British position in southern Arabia is vulnerable to a combination of border harassment, internal subversion, and pressure in the UN. Khrushchev, we believe, will try to exploit these weaknesses during his visit to Cairo in May, by encouraging Nasser to use the UAR presence in Yemen to support a “national liberation” struggle. He will take care not to involve the Soviet Union directly and will advise Nasser not to make any reckless moves.

[Here follows the body of the memorandum.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Aden, 1964-1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.↩