Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

336. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, May 8, 1964, midnight.

2631. Reference: Department Circular telegram 1990.²

I had intended devoting major part of upcoming interview with Nasser to situation in Yemen and Aden, with statement of US position as set forth in reference telegram. Shortly before appointment finally set Departmental instructions received concerning another topic whose importance seemed overriding. I therefore elected to deal extensively with second topic (which could only be presented to President)³ and leave Yemen-Aden for discussion with FonMinMahmoud Riad, who has followed question closely while Delegate to UN.

President Nasser received me 1930 May 7. After completing major presentation I stated that I had intended to discuss Yemen with him and set forth USA position, but now proposed to do this with FonMin Riad. President Nasser said that this would be a good move since Riad thoroughly conversant with matter and he was trying to make FonMin effective center for Ambassadorial representation. I noted that Riad would doubtless be busy during Khrushchev visit but that I needed to see him during coming week, the earlier the better. President Nasser responded that his FonMin “would not be very busy with Khrushchev” and indicated that he would see to it that Riad would be available. The President then briefly and on his own initiative made the following remarks on the Yemen-Aden situation.

1. Major purpose of President’s Yemen trip was to set forward urgently needed reorganization of YAR Government. As he had told me many times in past, YAR Government has been “hopeless,” beset with inexperience, inefficiency, personal rivalry, and tribal differences. Sallal has lost much support although he is a “good but sick man.” When Nasser went to Yemen he requested Sallal to take with him Yemen expatriates in UAR such as Jaifi and Noman, who, while critical of Sallal, might provide a center of popular support. While in Yemen Nasser produced a new constitution and government structure in discussion with Yemenis, this including Vice Presidents who, while under Sallal, were in fact to be effective administrators of government. He also arranged for popular assembly and overhaul of Political Bureau. When organization completed on paper, Yemenis requested five days for study and reaction but Nasser said that with something of an impish smile, “I gave them only 24 hours and they accepted it.” President admitted that paper structure of government is useless without competent operators but believed that some progress toward more stable and popular government has been made.

2. President’s attack in Yemen on British position was generated by the fact that UAR has “completely reliable and convincing evidence” of British arms, money and military support to Yemeni dissidents flowing across Southern border. President said, “because of this our men are being killed and I cannot accept this, hence my attack on the British.”

3. In general, the present UK Government under Lord Home seems to have reverted to the Eden outlook. Macmillan honestly tried to make a fresh start, letting bygones be bygones. Ever since Ottawa speech it has been clear to UAR that Home’s Government has turned its back on conciliatory Macmillan policy and is now acting in Eden mood.

4. Butler’s deliberate publicity of UK request for cut in American aid particularly irritated Nasser. He said that UK was publicly uttering threats against UAR and “if they can threaten, we can threaten also.” This, he said was natural extension of “harsh” policy to which he would continue strongly to react.

I pointed out to the President that it appeared to me unrealistic to expect that a government so near election as the Home Government could take any effective steps altering major UK policy. Nasser admitted this was true but emphasized again that when attacked he would respond in kind.

The President then requested that I review entire situation with the FonMin as suggested at opening of interviews.

Comment: It is interesting that Nasser chose to give me above details in light of my statement that I had not come to discuss Yemen-Aden and would make my presentation thereon to FonMin. I assume President’s evoking topic partly due to extended discussions I have had with him on this throughout past year but more particularly to defensive mood wishing to register directly with me his alleged objectives. It is interesting that when mentioning UK request for curtailment US aid he did not ask what the American reaction had been or what we intended to do. It seemed to me that his obvious assumption was that request had been fruitless.

President Nasser was obviously under the weather, looking gray and drawn and perspiring frequently. He said that ever since his return from Yemen he had been ill and was still taking heavy doses of antibiotics. On May 1 when he delivered his fighting speech against Britain he had some fever and felt particularly sick.

Badeau

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Repeated to London and Taiz.
2. Document 54.
3. Telegram 2632 from Cairo, May 8, recording this portion of the Ambassador’s conversation with Nasser is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Document 52.