Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

389. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 23, 1966, 3:33 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Yemen; Communism in the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz, Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia
• Ambassador Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Saudi Ambassador to the United States
• The Secretary
• Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
• Isa Sabbagh, USIA
• George C. Moore, Officer-in-Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs

The Secretary welcomed the Prince and the Prince extended King Faisal’s sincerest personal greetings.

Speaking on behalf of the King, the Prince said that the threat of Communism in the Near East was the biggest danger the Saudis now saw. They felt Islam was the strongest shield against Communism and endeavored to work on the basis of their religion against Communism just as we work against it as a doctrine. With full recognition of the broad intelligence gathering capabilities of the U.S., the Prince said the Saudis had strong indications that the Yemen problem and Nasser’s activities there were part of the long range Communist blueprint for gaining strength in the area. Nasser’s main aim seems to be to create chaotic situations and divert the constructive attitudes of countries like Saudi Arabia, which aim at building stability and economic progress.

Concerning Yemen, Nasser and Faisal undertook obligations to settle the problem in both the Bunker Agreement of 1963² and the Alexandria Agreement of 1964.³ The Saudis worked hard to carry out these agreements in letter and spirit, but found Nasser unwilling. Joint Saudi-UAR observation groups in Yemen were set up under the Alexandria Agreement. They came to an end, however, when Nasser forcibly sent the Saudi participants back over the border.

In August 1965, the Prince continued, under internal economic pressure and probably after strong words from the U.S., Nasser entered into the Jidda Agreement. Prior to his arrival at Jidda, Nasser had agreed with Faisal on the broad outlines of a settlement. As a result of the agreement, the Saudi ceased military and material assistance to the Yemeni royalists at the time of its signature on August 23. Subsequently, however, Nasser went to Moscow and developments took a different turn. Radio Sanaa violently attacked the agreement. The Yemeni Prime Minister travelled to various places (“including Russia and China”). Arms were brought into Yemen from various sources. (Three Soviet ships unloaded arms and equipment at Hodeida.) The Saudis reproached the UAR saying that these developments did not fit into the spirit of the agreement. The UAR responded that it was having trouble controlling the Yemeni republicans.

At the Harad Conference, said the Prince, the Saudis made all efforts to insure that the royalists would be responsive to opportunities to find a peaceful solution. Nasser failed to exert similar control over the republicans. When this was brought to his attention, Nasser suggested that the UAR and the Saudis again come together to work out a practical program for an agreement. Nasser responded by inviting Faisal to send his emissary to Cairo and at the same time forwarded to Faisal five suggested points: 1. the formation of a coalition provisional government; 2. this coalition government to be composed of 2/3 republicans and 1/3 royalists; 3. Yemen to be called, “State of Yemen”; 4. Egyptian troop withdrawal to be completed 10 months after the coalition government was formed; 5. the Hamid al-Din to be excluded from Yemen.

According to the Prince, Faisal became increasingly disturbed at the apparent Communist involvement indicated by the formation of “popular fronts” (“Tandhim al-Shaabi”) in Yemen; the presence of some 400 Chinese and a similar number of Russians in Yemen; the report that the USSR was establishing a submarine base on UAR territory; and an alleged agreement between the Yemeni republicans and the USSR—concluded with UAR help—for the Soviets to establish a naval base south of Hodeida. As a result, Faisal’s response to Nasser’s five points was as follows: a 50-50 representation of royalists and republicans as previously agreed on; withdrawal of UAR troops should take place within 10 months from November 23, 1965, in accordance with the Jidda Agreement (although its completion within 10 months from mid-February, the current time, would probably not be unacceptable); and, after a provisional government had been formed and both Saudi Arabia and the UAR had completely disengaged from Yemen, it would be incumbent on Nasser and Faisal to enforce any decision of that government to exclude the Hamid al-Din or any other group.

The Prince was surprised to learn that Nasser had said yesterday that UAR troops would stay in Yemen until the British withdraw from Aden in 1968. This appeared to indicate Nasser had no intention of carrying out the Jidda Agreement. The Saudis believed that this stemmed from Communist desires to continue the existence of chaos in Yemen.

The Secretary responded that we were most sensitive to any Communist moves to increase their control and would be particularly concerned with any such attempts to organize activity against Faisal. We believed it most important to have a close and systematic exchange of views on this subject with the Saudis. He requested Mr. Hare to work out the technique for implementing this on the basis most suitable to the Saudis (e.g., exchanges through our Embassy, or as desired). He said we had investigated and had found no confirmation of reports of Soviet submarine or naval bases in the area. He noted that Communist activity in other parts of the lower Red Sea also made it most important that we and the Saudis work closely together to improve our mutual understanding of what was going on, e.g., in South Arabian Federation, Somalia, etc.

Concerning Yemen, the Secretary said that he had today listened to UAR Vice President Anwar Sadat speak on the same subject. On the basis of the Prince’s and Mr. Sadat’s comments, he felt that the Jidda Agreement was not dead. He was inclined to discount Nasser’s speech of yesterday (the U.S. very often was not spared such attacks) and believed that further exploration of the points of the Jidda Agreement could lead to a solution. King Faisal had made very substantial diplomatic gains in the Jidda Agreement; every effort should be made to preserve that agreement in the best interests of Saudi Arabia.

Turning to details, the Secretary gave his impression that Cairo still considers itself bound by a commitment to establish a provisional coalition government; that it expects to withdraw its troops from Yemen within ten months of the time such a government is established; that it is committed to support a plebiscite amongst the Yemenis to decide their own future; that Nasser has conceded the name, “State of Yemen,” rather than “Republic of Yemen”. The Secretary noted that it seemed indeed to be a fact that Nasser had had his problems with the Yemenis. He recalled that when speaking to the Yemeni Foreign Minister last fall, the latter had betrayed discontent with the UAR and Saudi Arabia having arranged an agreement without consulting the Yemenis. Despite troubles with the Yemenis, however, he believed that in the end Faisal and Nasser would have the final say concerning a settlement. The background elements at the time of the Jidda Agreement were much the same as they are today, which puts continued pressure on Nasser to carry out the agreement. Since that agreement was so much in Saudi Arabia’s advantage, it would seem important for the Saudis to again attempt to make it work.

The Secretary commented on the great increase in stability and development in Saudi Arabia in the last three years, for which Faisal should be congratulated. He noted that implementation of the Jidda Agreement would contribute markedly to continuation of that stability, to the benefit of Saudi Arabia. He emphasized that we were not trying to intrude ourselves between the UAR and the Saudis, but hoped that they would explore every possibility for saving the valuable Jidda Agreement.

Mr. Hare said that he also had the same reaction after speaking to Mr. Sadat earlier in the day and had felt on reading the messages from Cairo and Jidda over the last few weeks that a certain spirit for agreement continued to exist on both sides. There was now only a cloud which needed to be pierced by quiet careful efforts from both parties.

The Prince said that his Government was fearful that the Yemen would explode, to the benefit of the Communists, if a settlement were not reached in the near future.

Mr. Hare asked if the Saudi reply to Nasser’s five points had yet been delivered in Cairo. The Prince said that, to his information, Saudi Ambassador Alireza returned to Cairo the day before yesterday and presumably requested an appointment with Nasser. He guessed that, since Nasser’s sharp personal attack yesterday on King Faisal, Ambassador Alireza might be instructed not to see the UAR President.

The Prince then asked if we had any doubt of Saudi sincerity in supporting the Jidda Agreement. The Secretary said he had implicit trust in King Faisal’s word that they supported the agreement. The Prince continued that they were ready in letter and spirit to find a settlement in Yemen but this was the third time that they had been deceived and he hoped we would not blame them for what they might have to do. Mr. Rusk referred to his personal involvement in nearly every great Communist-Free World crisis since World War II and said that he had learned patience to be the most important virtue since the alternatives were so terrible.

After asking about the Prince’s personal plans, the Secretary said he wished to discuss this matter in further detail with Mr. Hare and with the President and might be in touch with the Prince during the latter’s stay in New York over the next two days. He assured the Prince that any suggestions we make are not merely maneuvers but are direct, honest views based on deep friendship.

At the close of the discussion, the Prince noted that he had received a telegram from King Faisal asking that we seriously consider Jordan’s request for supply of aircraft to avoid Jordan’s being pressured to acquire Soviet planes at the forthcoming March Arab Prime Ministers’ Conference. The Secretary said we are much aware of the problem and are working hard to meet it.

The Prince expressed the hope that he could have some message from the President to take back with him to King Faisal.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on February 24 and approved in S on February 28. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
2. For documentation on the April 1963 disengagement agreement negotiated by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Presidential Special Emissary for mediation of the Yemen conflict, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 187–189, 193–196, 202–203, 205, and 209–211.
3. See Document 353.