Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State ⁰

Jidda, April 7, 1963, 1 p.m.

819. From Bunker. Cairo telegram 1655 to Department;¹ Jidda telegram 816 to Department.² View Faysal’s remaining strong objections to certain aspects disengagement proposals as expressed to me in first meeting April 5,³ I made following three slight revisions before second meeting April 6 which I believed went part way to meet Faysal’s concern and yet would be acceptable to Nasser (reference Eight point program agreed to by Nasser, see reference Cairo telegram):

1. Added clause to number one proposal as substitute for proposal number three: “Prevention by SAG of efforts of Iman’s adherents …” as follows: “and prohibition of the use of its (Saudi Arabia’s) territory by Royalist leaders to carry on the struggle in Yemen.”

2. Added following sentence to proposal number two: “the UAR would refrain from taking punitive action against the Yemeni Royalists on the basis of resistance mounted by the Royalists prior to commencement of disengagement.”

3. Altered middle clause Point 5 (apropos stationing of impartial observers in DMZ) from “who would be available as the occasion requires for use outside the DMZ” to “who would be free to travel outside the DMZ.”

Again I met with Saqqaf separately before session with Faysal. Former expressed optimism my changes would be approved by Faysal but felt Faysal would continue insist upon time limit for withdrawal.

I opened second meeting with Faysal by reiterating imperatives of prompt SAG disengagement on basis our proposals; commitment of President’s prestige and USG moral and power backing behind disengagement operation; and President’s undertaking hold UAR firmly to his statement of intention to withdraw its military forces from Yemen expeditiously. Faysal called attention to concessions he had already made since I had begun my mediation efforts and said that he had done so from desire be reasonable and because of appreciation of the position of “our friends, the Americans and their noble objective”. He said his previously expressed objections to certain aspects our proposals motivated not by desire quibble but based on necessity seek clarification. When he gave his word, he stuck by it. Therefore, all details of any undertaking he entered into had to be fully clarified in advance. I then showed Faysal the changes I had made since our previous meeting, stating that I had endeavored to go as far as possible in direction alleviating concerns he had expressed. I could not guarantee that Nasser would accept these changes but if Faysal approved, I would do my utmost obtain Nasser’s acquiescence. I noted that re change in Point 1 I had avoided specific reference to the Imam or his family (as had been his desire) while expressing the same concept. Faysal asked what types Hamid Al-Din activities were to be proscribed in Saudi Arabia. I gave examples of subversive operations of all kinds, arms smuggling across border, clandestine communications, sub rosa movement into Yemen by Royalists and radio propaganda. Comment: Revised Point 1 is actually more comprehensive than former Point 3 which applied only to Imam’s family and I believe should be more satisfactory to Nasser. End comment.

Re additional sentence in Point 2, Faysal said still did not meet requirement that UAR refrain from any kind offensive action against Royalists once disengagement started. I pointed our difficulties distinguishing between defensive and offensive actions view different interpretations placed by two sides and said that from humanitarian viewpoint (which Faysal had emphasized in first meeting) sentence I had appended should be fully satisfactory. Comment: Addition to Point 2 meets Faysal’s apprehension his cessation act without placing some form limitation on UAR military activity abandons Royalists to their possible annihilation by UAR troops in revenge for previous opposition to Central Government.

I had earlier commented to Faysal that since I was sure Nasser had no intention take this form of punitive action, I was hopeful he would accept. End comment.

Re change in Point 5, Faysal thought did not go far enough. Suggested alternative wording “one of whose responsibilities would be to travel freely outside the DMZ.” This I accepted. Comment: Believe this change merely expresses a little more explicitly actual and necessary role of UN observers. End comment.

We had long hassle over Faysal’s insistence we incorporate time limit for withdrawal UAR forces. I expressed view preferable leave open-ended since Nasser unlikely agree to timetable suitable to SAG and in any case President’s undertaking hold Nasser to expeditious withdrawal provided most effective lever. Faysal asked what I thought was reasonable timetable. Replied this extremely difficult answer but a possible rule of thumb was for UAR remove forces at same rate they introduced. Latter appeared to have taken four and a half to five months. Faysal characterized this as unreasonable, recalled semi-facetiously has [sic]; he had withdrawn his Wahhabi forces from Yemen in 1930’s in fifteen days. I replied only USG military experts could provide authoritative estimate re reasonable withdrawal period and reiterated fact commitment President’s prestige to expeditious UAR disengagement adequate insurance.

Finally Faysal commented movingly that as gesture confidence in President, USG, “your joint excellencies and assembled brethren” he prepared to acquiesce to fullest extent in proposals as presented and amended. I assured Faysal that his noble sentiments were not misplaced and USG valued highly its special relationship with SAG. Faysal stated “this country’s rulers have demonstrated their nobility of purpose by deeds rather than words.” I said we wished support Faysal’s endeavors wherever possible.

I asked Crown Prince whether he still desired have USG squadron aircraft once disengagement underway. Faysal replied that he did “in principle” but that he preferred that details be discussed by our respective military experts. I said in that case I would leave matter to Ambassador Hart deal with in consultation with our respective military advisors. I reminded Faysal of our additional undertakings expedite training his air force and develop expanded air defense training program. Faysal said this should also be taken up by the military.

In conclusion I informed Faysal that view UN involvement in disengagement operation I would appreciate Faysal’s sending message to UN SYG indicating his complete willingness receive UN SYG’s representative, presumably Dr. Bunche. Faysal expressed view such message had already been sent through SAG UN delegate. I indicate U Thant still under impression his representative not entirely welcome and suggested dispatch second message. Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf interjected to state clarifying telegram would be sent to Baroody and Faysal nodded approval. Comment: Faysal has come long way since my first talk and am convinced we can count on him play his part entirely satisfactorily in disengagement operation. I now intend return Cairo for final talk with Nasser and have asked Ambassador Badeau make appointment for Tuesday, April 9. Hopeful minor changes I have made here can be sold to Nasser though may take a little doing. If succeed with Nasser, will fix date for commencement of disengagement.

Re Faysal’s elliptical response to dispatching squadron, I have clear impression he wishes have this squadron soonest. This view reinforced by post-meeting comment made to Sabbagh by Faysal’s closest advisor, Rashad Pharaon. I am asking Ambassador Hart take up with CHUSMTM and Prince Sultan in order confirm this impression.

Faysal has placed all his faith in us re this exercise and there is no question USG must use full force its influence and suasion get Nasser carry out in good faith and expeditiously his part of bargain once final agreement achieved. Otherwise, we will have suffered serious loss of confidence, honor, prestige and good will in this country. End comment.

Following is full recapitulation disengagement proposals approved by Faysal:

1. Termination by the SAG on a date to be determined of its support and aid to the royalists and prohibition of the use of its territory by royalist leaders to carry on the struggle in Yemen.

2. The UAR to begin withdrawal of its troops simultaneously with suspension of Saudi aid to the royalists. The UAR would continue a phased withdrawal of its forces, in the course of which the UAR forces would be withdrawn from field activities to their bases pending their departure from Yemen. The UAR would refrain from taking punitive action against the Yemeni royalists on the basis of resistance mounted by the royalists prior to commencement of disengagement.

3. Cessation of United Arab Republic attacks on Saudi territory.

4. Establishment of a demilitarized zone extending for a distance of 20 kilometers on either side of the demarcated Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border from which military forces and military equipment would be excluded.

5. Stationing of impartial observers on both sides of the border in the demilitarized zone, one of whose responsibilities would be to travel freely outside the demilitarized zone to certify the suspension of Saudi support activities and the outward movement of UAR forces and equipment from Yemeni airports and seaports.

6. Cooperation of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia with the United Nations Secretary General’s representative or other mutually acceptable mediator in reaching agreement on process and verification of disengagement.

7. Agreement by the UAR to exercise its good offices on Sallal to desist from further inflammatory speeches against neighboring countries and to reaffirm his desire to live at peace with his neighbors. (Note: Faysal prefers that this point be of a bilateral nature between USG and UAR and not be incorporated in final agreement involving UAR and SAG).⁴

Hart

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Cairo, London, USUN, and Taiz.
1. Document 205.
2. In telegram 816 from Jidda, April 6, Bunker reported briefly on his April 5 conversation with Faysal. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
3. Memoranda of Bunker’s conversations with Faysal on April 5, 6, and 9 were transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-742 from Cairo, April 10; airgram A-743, April 10; and airgram A-770, April 20. (All ibid.)
4. Following this meeting, Saqqaf contacted Bunker and urgently requested that in point 2 the word “expeditiously” be inserted after “withdrawn.” (Telegram 824 from Jidda, April 8; ibid.) Nasser subsequently agreed to the proposals printed here with the addition of “as soon as possible” in point 2 and the rephrasing of point 5 to read: “one of whose responsibilities would be to travel outside the demilitarized zone as the occasion requires.” (Telegrams 1706 and 1707 from Cairo, April 9; ibid.) Faysal accepted the modifications. (Telegram 831 from Jidda, April 10; ibid.)